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CHAPTER I

AMERICAN LITERARY MAGAZINES AND THE
"Wi,W IMP ERIALI 5W' 1893-1898

The most tantalizing problems facei by students of international
relations are those which revolve around the question of motivation in
nationRl action. The role of ideas and attitudes in determining the
behavior of nations is an obtrusive factor in Avery international
situation. 1
Thus Albert Weinberg pinpoints a fascinating phase that has special
significance in the study of the "new imperialism."

Dr. Albert Shaw

strengthens \veinberg's assertion, when he declares that expansion is no
exception to the thesis that "the power and persistence of ideas lie at the
base of all historical movements.,,2

Parker T. Moon, discussing the dynamics

of imperialism, stated that "not direct interests, but ideas, not property
or profession but principles, activate the public at large,1I that i t is the
theories of the propagandists of expansion that impel nations to action. 3
Various writers have studied these ideas and attitudes of the "new
imperialism" that, as Weinberg, Shaw, and Moon maintain, may determine the
behavior of a nation, and they have found in their studies that these

lAlbert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny (Baltimore, 1935), Foreword, ix.
2Albert Shaw, "The Monroe Doctrine and the Evolution of Democracy,"
Proceedings 2f ~ Academy of Political Science, VII (1917), p. 471.
3Parker T. Moon, Imperialism and l:orld Politics (New York, 1930), p. 67.
1

2

attitudes and ideas fall into significant patterns of thought.

Weinberg

states that the ideology of American expansion is:
• • • its motley body of justificatory doctrines. It comprises
metaphysical dogmas of a nrovidential mission and quasi-scientific
'laws' of national development, conceptions of national right and
ideals of social duty, lee:al ration~lizations and app8als to the
'highest law,' aims of extending freedom and designs of extending
benevolent absolutism. 4
Here then, are the findings of one author as to the significant patterns of
thought that have been found to be a basis for the "new imperialism" of 1898.
This thesis accepts the definition of "new imperialism" as generally accepted
and studied by \\einberg.

To limit so complex a matter as the ideology of

expa;lsion to these few concepts is to run the risk of oversimplification;
therefore, no claim is made that these were the only ideological stimulants
to expansion.

But i t is likely that these ideas were crucial" and it is

believed that they offer a sound b<.:.sis for the analysis of expansionist
ideology here being undertaken.
other \Y-riters on this subject studied America's imperialism from a
different viewpoint.

Some authors, as Moon and vJeinberg, have studied jt

within the wider scope or vision of world imperialism.

Still others" as

r.rnest May and Theodore Greene have situated their studies in a rr.ore political
and diplomatic background of events and happenings.

Some have given it a

predominantly economic slant, as Charles Beard; others a defensive national
interest point of view.

Most authors have admitted and studied the ideo-

logical background, and have nointed out the importance of literature, both

'iieinberg, Introduction, p. 2.

3
newspapers and periodicals, in the spread of these ideas.

Marcus Wilkerson

analyzed public opinion in general and the Spanish-American War, while Joseph
Wisan concentrated on the New York press and the Cuban crisis, and Dr. Richard
Matre in a doctoral dissertation analyzed the Chicago press and imperialism. 5
This thesis prODoses to study the patterns of thought as reflected in
certain American literary magazines of that time.

Special attention is given

primarily to Nation and Forum, to find out if and how these patterns of
thought were reflected in the specific periodicals, either responding to or
reacting against, these ideas -- ideas following the patterns, to an extent,
of author Weinberg -- of "inevitable destiny," of "white man's burden," and
the related ideas of "self-defense" for the United
interest," and of "world leadership."

~tates,

of "paramount

This is the major concern and research

of the paper.
Nation and Forum were chosen as being typical of the literary magazines
of that time, and other magazines may be cited only occasionally to support
or strengthen some idea or to show the similarity of idea in other periodicals.
Nation and Forum were chosen because, according to Mott's analysis of them
their influence was significant due to the type of writers propounding their
ideas therein, and because of the type, not necessarily number, of subscribers
to these two periodicals.

~rcus Wilkerson, Public Qpinion and ~ Spanish-American ~ (Baton
Rouge, 1932), Joseph ~'Jisan, ~ Cuban Crisis .:i!! Reflected .in ~ ~ 1.Q.rk
Press, 1895-189~, (New York, 1934), and Richard A. Matre, ~ Chicago Press
~ Imperialism, 19S9-l902, Abstract of Dissertation, 1961.

4
It is a truism that great movements are said to begin among the intelligentsia and then drift down to popular expression.

Of interest then, would

be to see to what extent these patterns of thought are found in magazines
devoted to the upper class.

The American literary magazine, rather than the

general newspaper or popular magazine, form the intellectual milieu of the
United States, and it is the intelligentsia who are interpreting these patterns
of thought underlying the "new imperialism," reacting to them, and being influenced by them.

The intellectuals who wrote for Nation and Forum were often

political leaders, reflecting at least one segment of American political
thought.
The editors of these American periodicals cannot be passed over.
Lorettus S. Metcalf, Walter Hines Page, Alfred Ernest Keet, and Joseph M.
Rice, as editors of Forum, contributed greatly to the formation of public
opinion.

h'riting on Metcalf, first editor of Forum, F. L. Mott observed:

Metcalf conceived it to be his initial editorial duty to determine
what topics were of greatest timely significance and widest public
interest, and then to secure experts on those subjects to discuss
them in his magazine. This resulted in a very distinguished list
of contributors. • • • It would be difficult to find a better
exposition of the more serious interests of the American mind in
the decade 1886 to 1896 than is afforded by the first twenty
volumes of the Forum. 6
Of significance is the notable roll of contributors including senators, bishops
college presidents, and well-known novelists, e.g. Senators Henry Cabot Lodge,
George F. Hoar, J. B. Foraker, and Shelby M. Cullom.

6Frank Luther Mott, 1l History of American Magazines, )..8~5-1905
(Cambridge, 1957), pp. 511-512.

5
Commenting on the Forum at the time of Metcalf's retirement, the Review
of Reviews maintained that many men of England considered the magazine one of
the "ablest and timeliest ll periodicals in its class, and it thought that Page,
the succeeding editor, should continue to follow the policy and general line
of thought that made the Forum so successful. 7 In following this same
emphasis, Walter Hines Page's chief interest was also the enlistment of famous
and expert writers to comment on significant affairs.
After Page's departure for the Atlantic Monthly, his assistant, Alfred
Ernest Keet, carried on for several years, followed by Joseph Rice from 18971907.

Dr. Rice lacked the originality and agressiveness of his predecessors,

but he continued the traditions of Forum with respect to specialist writers
and symposiums.
In the same way, in regard to another literary magazine, the Nation,
Frank Luther Mott, in his analysis of American Magazines, again stated that
the list of the early contributors to Nation enrolled most of the famous
scholars and writers of the sixties and seventies and kept its contributors
in the eighties and nineties.

Writers like Bryce and Dicey, English cor-

respondents Higginson and Norton, such Harvard men as Channing, Hary,
Kittredge, and Winson, became Nation contributors, with others such as Joel
Chandler Harris, William Roscoe Thayer and James Ford Rhodes, as occasional
writers for the magazine. 8

7Review of Reviews, III (April, 1891), p. 288.
8

Mott, III, p. 335, p. 346.

6

The

inf~_uence

of Nation far exceeded its circulation.

Its subscribers

have included libraries, universities and other educational centers in the
count~r

and its contributors, as have been listed, included the educated

leaders who sway opinion.

James Bryce observed that it was read by two

classes of people, which in America have a strong influence in forming
political a:ld economic opinio~, namely, editors and University professors. 9
~ikin,

E. L.

founding Nation in 1865, showed at once a distinctive

style, a refreshing penetration, and a skill in ironic analysis never before
equalled in American journalism.
Allan Nevins in American Press Opinion asserted that the greatest role

.

in the leadership of opinion in the generation preceding the Civil War had
been played by Horace Greeley, and the "greatest single part in the next
generation

W'dS

with little doubt that of E. L. Godkin."

Godkin was editor-in-chief of the Nation.

From 1865 until 1899

Nevins felt that directly Godkin

never addressed more than 35,000 subscribers to the two publications, Nation
and Evening

~,

journals, through

but indirectly, as filtered "down through to the other
pvlpits~

through college chairs, and by word of mouth,"

his opinions affect.ed ai.most every corner of the land. 10
These were the magazines then, that are recordings of a climate of
opinion, and the historian cannot ignore them except at his peril.

9James Bryce, Studies

in

Contemporary Biography (New York, 1903),

p. 372, p. 378.

10Allan Nevins, American Press Opinion (Chicago, 1928), pp. 299-300.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE PATTERNS OF THOUGHT OR MOTIVES
UNDERLYING THE "NEW IMPERIALISM"

Underlying the whole problem of expansion, it would seem are the ideas
that motivate it, give it direction, and furnish its semantics.
What, then, are the principal beliefs constituting the rationale of
late nineteenth century American expansion?

Basically the ideology fell

into patterns derived from 1) science 2) humanitarianism 3) economics and
4) politics, and comprised, first of all, rationalizations of "inevitable

destiny," making full use of Darwin's "survival of the fittest."

They

included, secondly, the altruistic motive of extending freedom, benevolence,
and civilization to races less blessed.

Thirdly, they elaborated on all

the concomitant doctrines of self-defense, of naval power, and of necessity
against foreign imperialism.

The patterns then abetted the economists'

glorification of the pecuniary motive as the driving force in "progress,"
and finally, they broadened their scope again, with the world leadership
idea as the end result of the national prestige and political power themes.
All of these ideas, these patterns of thought, are what will be considered
in this paper, as providing the basis for the IInew imperialism" of 1898.
The beginning of the 1890 1 5 marked roughly the incipience of the
tendency which, though it was probably not consciously rolated to
7

8

philosophical imperialism, did prepare the foundation for and lead to this
ideology of 1898.

Lying in the popular mood in which ideology often

germinates, the seed of imperialism was an inclination toward two emotions
related to the elements of imperialist ideology; namely humanitarianism and
a belligerent spirit of national self-assertion.
The new imperialism differed from the manifest destiny of the 1840's in
that the latter had been largely a matter of emotion.

Much of it had been

simply an expression of a half-blind faith in the superior virility of the
American race and the superior beneficence of American political institutions. l

In the intervening years since the l840's, much had been done to

provide this new emotional concept with a philosophic backing.
merely the emotion of the 1840's.

It was not

The expansionists of the 1890's were

able to cite the lessons of science and of history in support of their
doctrine.

And their reasoning and arguments carried conviction to some

of the best minds of the period.

It was this reasoning and these arguments

that brought about a change in popular psychology that formed those
intellectual currents or those patterns of thought underlying the "new
imperialism. If
Probably the idea that first had a great impact for the new expansionist
philosophy was the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution through natural selection.

Darwin t s theory of the evolution of higher lite..forms through natural

selection, the "suMiival of the fittest tl in the "struggle for existence,"
was easily adaptable to sociological theorizing, and his American interpreters

lJulius Pratt, E;spa.nsionists ~ ~ (Baltimore, 1936), p. 8.

9
made the most of it.

If a ruthless struggle for existence among individuals

resulted in the survival and predominance of the "fittest" or biologically
"best, II a similar struggle among races or nations might be expected to
produce similar results.

Thus Pratt concludes:

" ••• ruthless inter-

national competition was justified in the name of 'progress. t ,,2 And Darwin
himself referred specifically to the United States when he wrote:
There is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful
progress of the United States, as well as the character of the
people, are the results of natural selection; the more energetic,
restless, and courageous men from all parts of Europe having
emigrated during the last ten or twelve generations to that great
countr,y, and having their succeeded best. Looking to the distant
future, I do not think that the Rev. Zincke takes an exaggerated
view when he says: "All other series of events -- as that which
resulted in the culture of mind of Greece, and that which resulted
in the empire of Rome -- only appear to have purpose and value
when viewed in connection with, or rather as subsidiar,y to, • • •
the great stream of Anglo-Saxon emigration to the west. 1I 3
Prominent Americans who applied Darwinian theor,y to practical conclusions
were two popular writers, John Fiske, the historian, and Josiah Strong, a
Congregational clergyman.
As a devout disciple of Herbert Spencer, interested in propagating the
theories of historical evolution and the survival of the fittest among
nations, John Fiske was determined to show that the Anglo-Saxons in the
United States had evolved the "fittest of all political principles -

2Julius Pratt,
1955), p. 23.

A History 2l

United States Foreign Policy (New York,

3Charles Darwin, Tile Descent of Man, and Selection .in Relation ~ SetS, I,
p. 179. The passage quoted by Darwin is from Rev. F. B. Zincke, ~ Winter
in ~ United States, p. 29.

10

federalism -- upon which all the world would at some future time be organized.
Anglo-Saxons, he felt, excelled not only in institution but in growth of
numbers and in economic power, and he firmly believed that because of the
superiority of their institutions and the growth of their power, the AngloSaxons were bound to lead the world.

Theirs was an inevitable destiny.

Having already spread out over two hemispheres, he felt they could not fail
to keep that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy first
acquired in the settlement of America.

As he said:

It is enough to point to the general conclusion that the work
which the English race began when it colonized North America is
destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that
is not already the seat of an old civilization shall become
English in its language, in its religion, in its political habits
and traditions, and to a predominant, extent in the blood of its
people. The day is at hand when four-fifths of the human race
will trace its pedigree to F~glish fore-fathers, as four-fifths
of the white people of the United States trace their pedigree
today. The race thus spread over both hemispheres, and from
the rising to the setting sun, will not fail to keep that
sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy which it
began to acquire when England first stretched its arm across
the Atlantic to the shores of Virginia and Massachusetts. 4
Theories of race superiority lent themselves exceedingly well to a justification of imperialism.

Foster Rhea Dulles implied that the premise of racial

superiority was generally assumed "in support of each successive step
toward American overseas expansion."

He believed that publicists repeatedly

pictured the United States as standing guard over western civilization.

They

urged the annexation of new territory in the Caribbean, in the Pacific, and
off the coasts of Asia, not only in the national interest, but in behalf of

4John Fiske~ "Manifest Destiny,11 Harper's lim! Monthly Magazine,
LXX (March, lSS5), pp. 578-590.

11

the welfare of the world. 5 Thus Foster Rhea Dulles linked this racial
superiority with the responsibility it carried with it.

The theme of

destiny, inevitable destiny, was a corollary of the theme of duty.

Repeatedly

it was declared, says Richard Hofstadter, "that expansion was the result of
a 'cosmic tendoncy,' that destiny always arrives, that it was in the
inexorable logic of events.,,6 The doctrine that expansion was inevitable
had, of course, long been familiar to Americans.

Manifest Destiny had often

been invoked throughout the nineteenth century.

Albert Weinberg had pointed

out that this expression took on a new meaning in the nineties.

Previously,

destiny had meant primarily that American expansion, when we willed it,
could not be resisted by others who might wish to stand in our way.

During

the nineticfI it came to mean that expansion "could not be resisted by
Americans themselves, caught, willing or unwilling," in the coils ot fate.?
Again, theirs was an inevitable destiny -- to empire -- with its concomitant
idea of duty.
Even more assertive in the development of such ideas was Josiah Strong.
Strong's widely read and widely quoted

~

Countt[ had a persuasive influence.

The Anglo-SliXon, Strong wrote, held in his hands the destinies ot mankind,
and the United States was to become the home of this race, the principal seat
of his power, the great center of his influence.

•

He maintained that:

5Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise ~ World Power (New York, 1954),
p. 32.

6Quoted from Daniel Aaron, ed., Americ§ in Crisis (New York, 1952),
p. 193.
?Weinberg, p. 254.

12

••• this race of unequaled energy, with all the majesty of
numbers and the might of wealth behind it -- the representative,
let us hope: of the largest liberty, the purest Christianity,
the highest civilization -- having developed peculiarly agressive
traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will
spread itself over the earth. If I read not amiss, this powerful
race Will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central a.nd ~>'outh
America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and
beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition
of races will be the "survival of the fittest,,?8
This was the "white man's burden."
Strong's starting point was his concern with world evangelization,
reflecting the powerful missionary impulses of this generation in American
life.

He was convinced that such evangelization was the duty of the

Anglo-Saxon people.

With their two great ideals of spiritual Christianity

and civil liberty, they had risen by

£

process of natural selection to

world pre-eminence.
It

~~s

the unique taske of the United States, Strong further believed,

to make certain that this expansion spread abroad American national ideals.
He felt that as custodian of the two greatest developments in human history -civil liberty and pure spiritual Christianity -- the Anglo-Saxon was divinely
commissioned to be, in a peculiar sense, his brother's keeper.

Strong

questioned whether there was room for reasonable doubt that the race, "unless
devitalized by alcohol and tobacco" was destined to "dispossess many weaker
races, assimilate others, and mold the remaining," until .. in a very true and
important sense, it had Anglo-~axonized mankind. 9

8Josiah ~:trong, Our Country;: lli Possible Future and Its Present Crisis
(New York, 1885), pp. 208-227.
9~., p. 225.

13
Religious groups throughout the nation gradually united in support of
the imperialism of righteousness, of duty and destiny, of the "white man's
burden."
The third and fourth background patterns of thought underlying the new
imperialism included not only the concept of a superior race and a moral
mission, but the traditional realistic arguments laid down by the early
Hamiltonians in their program for overseas power.
of self-interest, force, and power politics.

They outlined a philosophy

They included the ideas of

security and of paramount interest.
No writer had more influence in shaping this expansionism than
Captain Alfred T. Mahan.

He not only influenced public thinking by means

of his books, innumerable articles and letters to newspapers. but also by
close personal association with men in a position to put his ideas into
effect.
Mahan's historical studies on the influence of sea power. with the
realization that new forces were invading "that little corner" which had
previously made up the world of the United States, convinced him that "no
nation, certainly no great nation, should henceforth maintain the policy
of isolation." And once persuaded that the United States could not live
unto itself, Mahan preached this broader point of view unceasingly -"whether they will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward. ,,10
And in The Interest of America in Sea Power. in which he urged that the
country pursue a stronger policy that the present one of "passive self-

l<\Jilliam Livezey, Mahan On Sea Power (Oklahoma, 1947), pp. 77-78.

14
defense," Mahan pointed out:
All around us now is strife; the strugg~e of life, the
race of life, are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their
significance till we stop to think about them. Everywhere nation
is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others. ll
Mahan was primarily concerned with naval power and had analyzed the
concept of this power, using England as a model.

.

He concluded that the basic

elements of power were trade -- including ODen markets and protected markets
like colonies -- the ships to carr,y trade, and militar,y and naval strength
to protect shipping and trade in time of war.

His was an ambitious program

Accepting the thesis that a growing volume ot

of mercantile imperialism.

industrial production demanded new foreign markets to maintain a healthy
economy, Mahan insisted that in the face of existing imperialistie rivalries
the United States had to be prepared to safeguard its commercial interests
throughout the entire world.

This meant a strong and powerful navy, tor

only that nation which commanded the seas was in a position ot real power,
and such a navy in turn had to have overseas bases to operate eftectively
away from its home ports.

This implied colonies, and on this subject Mahan

maintained:
Such colonies the United States has not and is not likely to
have. • • • Having theretore no foreign establishments, either
colonial or military, the ships of war ot the United States,
in war, will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their

llAlfred Mahan, ~ Interest .2! America in ~ POwer (Boston,

1897), p. 18.

15
own shores. To provide resting places for them, where they
can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a
government proposing to itself the development of the power
of the nation at sea. 12
At this time, Mahan's ideas had special significance and meaning to
those businessmen pushing aggressively into foreign markets.

'fhe growing

productivity of farms and factories would compel a search for foreign markets,
as we shall see later.

The competition for markets and colonies being carried

on by the seaboard powers of Europe, especially the aggressiveness shown in
the Pacific, in Africa, in South America, might bring these powers into
collision with the United States.

The prospective piercing of the Isthmus

of Panama, which could create havoc for the United States in her present
state of military and naval preparation; the very unsettled political conditions rampant in Haiti, Central Amorica, and the Hawaiian Islands, places of
great military and commercial importance, whose control also had international
implications -- all these things could perhaps force the United States to
abandon her usual complacency and could lead her to "look outward" and to
build up her sea power.
America must be reaqy in attitude and in actual preparation; hence
Mahan sketched the outlines of his program.

In addition to constructing a

modern navy and adequate coast defenses, the United States must be ready to
take, when opportunity offered, such outlying positions as would confer
mastery of the essential and necessary water routes.

Of special importance,

12Alfred Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783
(Boston, 1890), p. 83.

16
when the isthmian canal should have been opened, would be the control of the
Caribbean.

Mahan again insisted:

Control of a maritime region is insured primarily by a navy;
secondarily, by positions, suitably chosen and spaced one from
the other, upon which as bases the navy rests, and from which
it can exert strength. At present the positions of the Caribbean
are occupied by foreign powers, nor may we, however disposed
to acquisition, obtain them by means other than righteous; but
a distinct advance will have been made when public opinion is
convinced that we need them, and should not exert our utmost
ingenuity to dodge them when flung at our head. 1 3
Mahan was also concerned with the Pacific.

The United States would need

not only the unobstructed use of the isthmian canal, but outposts in the
Pacific as well, and the most logical outpost was in the Hawaiian Islands.
Already in 1890 Mahan had written that for the defense of the west coast
it was necessar,r that no foreign power acquire a lodgment in those islanda.14
The fear or concern for foreign imperialism was constantly pushed to the fore.
It follows then that imperialism of this kind appealed to members of
both business and political elites as an enlargement of the sphere of American
power or honor and profits.

Many of the underdog elements also responded to

this new note of national self assertion.

This became the Ifparamount interest"

pattern, with its national honor theme and emphasis on economic necessity.
A directive motive in the expansion policy was demand for markets and for
profitable investment by the exporting and financial classes within each
imperial regime.

The rising productivity of industr,r required larger imports

13Alfred Mahan, tiThe United States Looking Outward," Atlantic
Monthly, (December, 1890), pp. 102-103.

14Ibid •

17
of some forme of raw materials, more imported foods for larger urban
populations, and a great variety of imported consumption goods for a rising
standard of living.

These imports could be purchased only by a corresponding

expansion of exports, or else by the incomes derived from foreign investments
which implied earlier exports of capital goods.

As J. A. Hoblson declared:

It was this sudden demand for foreign markets for manufactures and
for investments which was avowedly responsible for the adoption of
Imperialism as a political policy and practice by the Republican
party to which the great industrial and financial chiefs belonged,
and which belonged to them. The adventurous enthusiasm of President·
Theodore Roosevelt and his "manifest destiny" and "mission of
civilization" party must not deceive us. It was Messrs. Rockfeller,
Pierpont Morgan, and their associates who'needed Imperialism and who
fastened it upon the shoulders of the great RepUblic of the West. 1 5
One aspect of American imperialism can then be seen as the natural
product of economic pressure of a sudden advance of capitalism which could
not find occupation at home and needed foreign markets for goods and for
investments.
National interest was only one point in the arguments for expansion.
This interest was also identified with the concern for the welfare of the
world at large, and thus it developed into the world leadership pattern of
thought.

With her frontage on the Pacific, the United States stood guard

over the preservation of Western civilization.

But it was her role not only

to defend but to extend the blessings of that civilization.

Again Mahan's

arguments were used, as he brought together, logically and persuasively, the
several factors supporting an emergent imperialism.

Dulles explains these

factors as:

l5~uoted from Theodore Greene, ed., American Imperialism in 1898
(Boston, 1955), p. 11.

18
• • • the aggressive restlessness underlying the struggle for
survival among the great powers, the consequent necessity for the
United States to build up predominant economic and political
strength, and the moral responsibility of the nation to maintain
a position which would enable it to uphold law and justice in
international society.16
The forces then, leading toward the move of expansionism, were very
powerful, representing as they did what seemed to be the demands of duty
and destiny, national security, commercial advantage, and an obligation of
leadership, and obligation of spreading abroad American principles.

Never-

theless they might not have carried the day had it not been for the insistent
propaganda of the expansionists themselves.

Their skillful appeal to logic

and emotions was of decisive importance in creating public support for
imperialism.
Yet it was by no means clear that the American government and public
were really interested in foreign affairs.

Press reports, editors, and

politicians argued these controversial issues at length.

In the nation

could be heard eloquent voices attempting to stir up a crusading spirit,
or an imperialist movement, or a revival of aggressive Anglophobia.
appealed for the maintenance of isolationism.

Others

And the American literary

magazine carried these diverse ideas and these diverse patterns of thought
in varying degrees and with varying interpretations.

The importance of

their influence cannot be directly measured, but it seems only reasonable to
admit that they were an important contribution in the formation of the
American policy of supporting or reacting to the new imperialism of 1898.

16Foster Rhea Dulles, America' s ~ .t2 World Power, 1898-1951t
(New York, 1954), p. 33.

CHAPTER III
"INEVITABLJt~

DESTINY" REFLECTED IN LITERARY MAGAZINES

7he idea of a destiny which presides over and guides American expansion
has rarely, if ever, been absent from the national consciousness.

The

precise character of that destiny, however, as well as the ultimate goal
to which it points, has varied with changing ideas and circumstances.

At

the close of the nineteenth century, natural destiny lay beyond continental
U.S.A. and the triumph of this idea whether on the gro\Uld of alleged national
interest or moral obligation, can be explained only in terms of the new
conditions prevailing in the country at the end of the nineteenth century.l
Specifically American expansion centered about the disposition of the
Philippine Islands at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War of 1898.
To better understand the issues of the treaty debates of 1898 and 1899,
the historian may examine the articles of Nation and Forum.
The American belief in Manifest Destiny that gained acceptance in the
l840's arose from an emotional sense of mission.

It was the duty of America

to furnish democratic ideals and their successful application to a world
emerging from absolute monarchy.

Thus Alexis de Tocqueville, the French

~erle Curti, .1l.ut Growth ~ American Thought (New York, 1943), p. 667.
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observer, noted when he wrote (in 1830's) thnt

eveI1~hing

concerning

democracy showed us as a "seminal font" and elaborate laboratory.2
In le99 the American people broke with their traditions of idealism
as they approved acquisition of the Philippines.

Expansionism carried

them across the Pacific away from continental lI.S.A. and to a major
strategic commitment in the Far East.

The acquisition of the Philippines

was recognized by contemporaries on both sides of the debate to be a turning point in our history.
Background events that shed much light on this final situation of the
Philippines began on January 28, IB93, when Americans read a bulletin from
Honolulu, Hawaii.

Two weeks earlier, this news report stated, a group of

American residents had overthrown a young native queen and formed a provisional government.

A Committee of Public Safety, largely composed of

Americans, and having the support of the American Minister, Mr. Stevens,
seized control of the government in Honolulu.

Marines from the U.S.S. Boston

had landed at the request of the American minister in order to protect lives
and property.

Violence had ended quickly.

The rebels were in full control

and were said to have enthusiastic support from the populace.

Most note-

worthy of all, they had announced the intention of asking the United States
to annex the islands.
The proposition seemed to come unexpectedly, and neither politicians
nor journalists knew quite what to make of it.

The molders of public

opinion seemed to be waiting to learn what mold the public wanted.

2Alexi5 de Tocqueville, Democracv in America (London, 1946), Forward,
xiv.
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'!'ho press focused attention on "inevitable destiny." Magazine articles,
congression~l

debates, and public speeches, in sharp contrast with the apathy

of the previous decade, vigorously expounded the new overseas expansionism.
The argument for overseas

expan~ion W"d.S

the rrtYth of raciu.l superiority,

derived from the evolutionary theories set forth by Charles Darwin and
popularized by John Fiske and John Burgess.
Fiske firmly believed that because of the superiority of their institutiona and the growth of their power, the Anglo-Saxons were bound to lead
the world by keeping that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial
supremacy first acquired in the settlement of America. 3 It was inevitablo.
Burgess was convinced that Anglo-Saxons were uniquely endowed with the
capacity for establishing national states, were forordained to carry
political institutions to all parts of the world, and consequently "must
have a colonial policy.n4
Editorially Nation opposed inevitable destiny.
issue of February 9, 1893, that destiny mayor could

It pointed out in the
~dso

mean that the

United States continue its past role in Hawaii because nthe situation
heretofore has been exactly to our liking and we may well ask why it should
be changed.,,5

JJohn Fiske, "Manifest Destiny," Harper's Mdgazine, LXX (March, lSg5),
pp. 578-590.
4John ~·l. Burgess, Political ~;cience and Comparativ~ Constitutionel ~,
I (Boston, 1891), p. 45.

5Nation, LVI (February 2, 1893), p. 75.
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A week later the editor questioned the validity of racial destiny of
the Social Darwinists.

He implied that different races would not necessarily

live in peace simply because the Anglo-Saxon race was exercising dominant
control.

Nation stated:

And those who desire for the republic greater variety of races, and
especially more color in our population, would do well, if they have
the stomach for it, to read the account on Thursday last, of the
burning and torture of a negro in Texas. That shocking story is a
sufficiently awful illustration of the power of race hatred to
convert Anglo-Saxons, at least, into rtevils incarnate. Do you want
more material to feed this apparently unextinguishable passion?6
There were others writing in the periodicals though who saw in the
Anglo-Saxon race specific qualities that made it expansive.

In March, 1893,

John R. Procter, soon to be head of the Civil Service Commission, contributed to The American JOUrnal

~

Politics an article which contained some

particularly pertinent obser-,rnt.ions cClnoerning the expanBi ve qualities of
the race.

Procter believed that the Anglo-Saxons who came from Britain

were lithe most adventurous, the most restless descendants of that hardy
rover race."

Discussing the "restless" march of Anglo- Saxondom he asked:

Will not the same spirit that brought the Norse sea rovers
to that beautiful Britain and sent their descendants worldward
from that island home, carry the aggressive Anglo-Saxons of the
Greater Britain, inheriting the same Teutonic greed for land, with
the aggressive colonization instincts and assimilating forces
intensified; with a love of adventure and of gain, and an adaptability of commerce -- will not these forces, more potent than written
laws, force American enterprise to look more and more, as we
grow stronge and richer, beyond the limits of our own territorial
restriction.

7

6Ibid., (February 9, 1893), p. 93.
7"The Nicaragua Canal, II The American Journal of Politics, II
(March, 1893), p. 231.
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And Ih! Review 2!. Reviews, in June, 1893, commenting editorially upon
the frequency of revolutions and wars in the Latin American countries,
observed that it seemed as though these countries with their large mixture
of Indian blood "were determined to kill themselves off in order that
their land might become the heritage of the Anglo-Saxon or some other stable
race with capacity for industrial development and social order. ,,8
Nation did not concur with the policy of "inevitable If annexation on
any grounds but pointed out the effect this "general readiness to subjugate
and dominate or control outside this continent would have on our domestic
institutions. ,,9
As the Hawaiian issue approached the time of decision, Mahan entered
the propaganda campaign.

He looked upon the Hawaiian question as important

both in itself and in the precedent it would create.

He prepared for the

Forum an article which appeared late in February, 1893.

Mahan took for his

postulate the concept that growth is a vital necessity to a nation.
of growth amounts to stagnation and decay.

Cessation

He asserted the "inevitable

destiny" of the United States to expansion when he wrote:
In our infancy we bordered upon the Atlantic only; our youth carried
our boundary to the Gulf of Mexico; today maturity sees us upon the
Pacific. Have we no right or no call to progress farther in any
direction? • • • This is the question that has long been looming upon
the brow of a future now rapidly passing into the present. Of it the
Hawaiian incident is a part -- intrinsically, perhaps, a small part,
but in its relations to the whole, so vital that, as has been said,
a wrong decision does not stand by itself, but involves, not only
in principle, but in fact, recession along the whole line.

8.lh!, Review.2! Review!, VII (June, 1893), p. 523.
9Nation (March 9, 1893), pp. 173-174.

And then Mahan very pointedly continued:
In our natural, necessary, irrepressible expansion, we are here come
into contact with the progress of another great people, the law of
whose being has impressed upon it a principle of growth which has
wrought mightily in the past and in the present is visible by
recurring manifestations. lO
Later in the same article, Mahan again reiterated his plea for understanding that this anneYAtion of Hawaii was part of the natural destiny of
the United States.

He asserted:

This is no mere question of a particular act, for which, possible,
just occasion may not have offered yet; but of a principle, a policy,
fruitful of many future acts, to enter upon which, in the fulness
of our national progress, the time has now arrived. The principle
being accepted, to be conditioned only b,y a just and candid regard
for the rights and reasonable susceptibilities of other nations. • •
the annexation even of Hawaii, would be no mere sporadic effort,
irrational because disconnected from an adequate motive, but a first
fruit and a token +:.hat the nation in its evolution haa arou.sed itself
to the necessity of carrying its life -- that has been the happiness
of those under its influence -- teyond the borders that have heretofore sufficed for its activities. ll
The article opened a series,12 all directed to the theme of growth and
the inevitability of decay if the growth is retarded.

The article was on

the stands by February, though it was in the March number.
Mahan's position was promptly challenged by Cooley.

Was there even a

constitutional warrant for the acquisition of such outlying possessions?
Judge T. M. Cooley, formerly a member of the Michigan Supreme Court and of
the Interstate Commerce

Com~isBion

wrote in Forum also, and argued that

lOAlfred T. Mahan, IIHawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum, X.v
(March, 1893), p. 2.
11

~.,

p. 7

later issued in his book,
1897) •

1h! Interest of America
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there was not this constitutional warrant, and he did not consider this
acquisition either destiny or duty.

wbile the constitution itself imposed

no limit upon the treaty-making power, that power, he reasoned, was in reality
limited by the conditions under which the Constitution was made and the
purpose of its makers; and the founding fathers, he was sure, had in mind
neither states nor territories of non-homogeneous people, nor the erection
of a colonial system.

As he said:

Now outlying colonies are not within the contemplation of the United
States at all. The structure of government created under it never had
in view such colonies and the people of the United States would never
have consented to provide for our holding them. • •• This proposed
treaty is not only one that will constitute a precedent for uniting
ourselves to any country on the globe, but it is one that will justify
our annexing other countries regardless of the differences of race
and of the discordant elements that might be brought into the Union
by the act. • •• The Constitution was made for the government of
the United States of America, and not of countries in different parts
of the world. It was not made and shaped for the establishment of
any colonial system. l )
An important point, however, is that those who used the argument of
"inevitable destiny" sought to create the impression that certain events
were fated to take place, that whether good or evil they were bound to
occur.

Actually the argument was usually employed to take all cases, good

or evil, out of the realm of human volition.

That this argument had its

effect is demonstrated by the observation made in another periodical, the
Atlantic Monthly, by an opponent of the absorption by the United States
of the countries of Latin America, that lIif destiny condemns us to absorb

l)nlOmas M. Cooley, "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation," Forum,
XV (June, 189), pp. 393-396.
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them • • • the longer the day is postponed the better for us. ,,14

Such

absorption was felt to be wrong, but it was also feared that the United States
might be compelled by destiny to carr,r it out.
There were other references to the idea of inevitability in the
periodicals during this period.

Henry Pratt Judson, a.t the time, Dean of

the Colleges at the University of Chicago and later its president, in the
Review

S11.

Reviews" March, 1893, argued that the United States could no longer

remain isolated and that it "cannot help being one of the foremost states
even if it would. ,,15

Similarly, a writer in the Political Science Quarterly

observed that after the Hawaiian revolution of 1893 the Unlted States
"awoke to the fact that perhaps in spite of ourselves and our national
prejudices the logic of events had extended our zone of political influence
far beyond our supposed definitive boundaries.,,16
Cone;ressmen, Senators, and reporters spoke of many diverse reasons
either in support of or opposing expansion, or more specifically annexation
of Hawaii.

There was talk that Grover Cleveland, the incoming President,

wanted Hawaii and also wanted Canada and the West Indies.

Thomas F. Bayard,

Secretary of State in Cleveland's first term, said Hawaii should become
America's.

r:·ome members of the party remained suspicious, but as the

adminis~

tration prepared to send a treaty to the Senate, reporters judged that it

14Browne , "Latin and Saxon America," Atlantic Monthly, LXIV, p. 840.
l5ffAmerican Politics: A Study of Four Careers (Blaine, Lamar, Hayes,
Butler), II Reviel-l of Reviews, VII (March, 1893), p. 160.
l6Robert N. Keely, M.D., "Nicaragua and the Mosquito Coast," Political
Science {,Guarterly, XLV (June, 1894), p. 160.
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would be ratified by more than the necessary two-thirds vote.
Cleveland personally intervened with a request that the Senate defer
action and give him time to study the matter.

Since the President-elect

did not even intimate that he would oppose annexation, both Democrats and
Republicans acquiesced.
The new President decided that scrutiny of the question would require
some time.

He withdrew the treaty and sent a commissioner to Hawaii to

gather data and to survey opinion among the native population.

Eventually,

with the report of James H. Blount, the agent whom he had sent to Hawaii,
and with Walter Gresham, his new Secretary of State, he drafted a Presidential statement declaring not only that annexation should be renounced, but
that justice called for redressing the wrong by at least an apology to the
Queen, together with a quick effort to persuade the revolutionaries that
they should restore her.
This caused a great deal of speculation and conflict on the part of
annexationists and anti-annexationists.

The blossoming imperialist move-

ments probably lost their force for a time.

As Ernest May wrote:

the beginning, it had been moralistic as well as imperialist.

"From

While leaders

like Lodge, Frye, and Morgan spoke of security, advantage, and gain, many
editors, and most clergymen used words like 'duty,'

I

destiny,' and

~

'mission. ,"17

l7Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy (New York, 1961), p. 23.
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Albert Shaw, the youthful editor of the popular American Review

2!

Reviews, wrote in 1893 of America's past failure to seek colonies as a
"policy more selfish and. timid than it was broad and enlightened." After
annexation had come to seem unlikely, he described the great powers as
"watching••• with a l!Iomewhat puzzled and bewildered but also a very alert
and fixed attention" and urged Congress to exhibit a "sense of the national
dignity and the national destiny."lS
Meanwhile, Nation had been praising President Cleveland for his
cautious policy, compliment.ing Mr. Blount for his carefully prepared legal
case, and maintaining that annexation was not the inevitable destiny of
the United States, but only an unreasonable act being forced by a few
individuals and groups.
In an editorial of December, 1893, Nation angrily retorted that there
was much discussion in the Senate about the President not keeping it informed about matters in Hawaii, and then continued:
But not one word was said in the debate as to what a President should
do when an unauthorized act of war has been committed in a foreign
country by a representative of the Unlted States, and. a legitimate
representative government thereby overthrown • • • • This is exactly
what has happened in Hawaii. • • • Has the President under the
Constitution no power to undo wrongs committed in foreign countries
without authority by his officers or agents? Somebody ought to
answer this question.19

l8Review 2! Reviews, VII (April, 1893), p. 116.
19Nation, LVII (December 14, 1893), p. 439.
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Some weeks later Nation denounced the annexation of Hawaii, which, is
maintained, may come about eventually, not because of inevitable destiny,
but simply as a result of force and manueverings.

Nation very strongly

stated:
The Hawaiian annexationists have scored a great point in getting the
'Portuguese colony' to come out strongly for annexation to the United
States. This was accomplished in a mass meeting of that colony held
on February 19, when stirring resolutions were passed to that effect.
As there are 8,602 Portuguese in the islands, 6,276 of whom cannot
read and write, the importance of this accession to the annexation
cause will be apparent. 20
In May, 1894, Forum, at one point, praised the handling by the adminietration of the Hawaiian case, while in another article, S. M. Cullom,
taking inventory of the administration's policy and finding it lacking, felt
it inevitable to extend the sovereignty and jurisdiction of this nation.
He said:
The entire country had cheerfully and patriotically concurred in
the wisdom and Americanism of the foreign policy of the retiring
administration, and from Cape Cod to the Seal Islands not a
dissentient syllable was heard in regard to the cherished proposition
of President Harrison's administration peacefully to extend the
sovereignty and jurisdiction of this Republic over the waiting
population of the beautiful islands of the western sea. 21
Henry Cabot Lodge, in the March issue of the Forum, strongly supported
and maintained the inevitable destiny of the United States.

"There is a very

definite policy for American statesmen to pursue in this respect if they
would prove themselves worthy inheritors of the principles of Washington

2ONation, LVIII (March 22, 1894), p. 204.
2lWilliam E. Russell, "A Year of Democratic Administration, II Forum,
XVII (May, 1894), p. 268.
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and Adams."

He further asserted that there may be no extens:!.on to the

South, but from the Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean, there should be one flag
and one country, that the United States should build the Nicaragua canal,
should control the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, and Cuba -- all this for the
interests and destiny of the United Statea. 22
In a following issue of Forum, George Bourinot challenged Lodge's
"inevitable destiny" including Canada.

He answered that Canadians did

not favor annexation and that a change in the

~stem

and method of their

government \iou1d not be conducive to the liberty and happiness of the
Canadian people.

He then showed how the Canadian government, politics,

and economic system, were very effective and even more

GO

than the United

States. 23
Nation had also disagreed with Lodge's article in Forum.

It was

cynical of his reasoning, and of his "kindergarten methods of instruction,"
and it laughed at his "Americanism" and national duty idea. 24
In early 1895, the headlines had proclaimed the new revolution in
Cuba, a war for independence, and throughout the island small armed bands
struck at Spanish garrisons and roads and railroad lines.

The United States

reacted instinctively against Spain.

22Henry Cabot Lodge, flOur Blundering Foreign Policy," Forum, XIX.
(March, 1895), p. 16.
23George Bourinot, lrV\by Canadians Do ~lot Favor Annexation," Forum,

XIX. (May, 1895), p. 27P..

24Nation, LX (March 14, 1895), p. 191.
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In most American eyes, the rebels were fighting for an independent
republic and for such American-patent blessings as free enterprise, free
schools, and free churches.

Even the most isolationist American newspapers,

such as the New York Evening

~,

the Springfield Republican, and the

Boston Transcript, expressed hope that the Cubans would succeed.

It was

at this time that many newspapers became voluntary propaganda organs for
the Cubans.

Sensation-mongering papers like William Randolph Hearst' Band

Joseph Pulitzer's later dispatched special correspondents to vie with shocking accounts of Spanish atrocities.
In an editorial, Nation severely criticized the United States policy
of "manifest destiny" in Cuba by referring to the illiterate population.
It stated:
How easy it is for Spain -- how easy it would be for the United
States if Lodge and Frye had their piratical way -- to make Cuba
a model of self-government and political purity, may be seen by a
glance at the nature of the population • • • • Illiteracy mounts up
to alarming proportions: 76 percent of the population can neither
read nor write • • • • From all this it can be inferred hoW' ripe Cuba
is for independence and republican institutions, especially how
ready to become a state in our Union. What delightful colleagues
for Lodge and Morgan in the Senate would Cuba furnish • • • • With
hearts beating true to sugar and tobacco and all other 'good things'
in sight, they would seem to be fore-ordained to seats in the Senate;
and Senator Proctor's objections to receiving them must be set down
to advancing age, the pharisaic spirit, and blindness to manifest
destiny. 25
Nation, in October, 1895, commenting upon Captain Mahan's article,
liThe Future in Relation to American Naval PoW'er,,,26 again struck a blow

25Nation, LX (April 25, 1895), p. 320.
26Harpqr's ~ Monthly Magazine, XCI (October, 1895), p. 774.
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at the idea of inevitability.

It refused to accept the determinism or

the inevitability implied, and was sharply critical of Mahan for speaking
"again and again of the development of the nation and of national sentiment
as a 'natural force,' moving on to its desired end, unconscious and
unmoral. ,,27
In a conment on Murat Halstead's book, The Stoty .2!

~,

as having

value as the report of a newspaper correspondent who has recently visited
Cuba, Nation again referred to the "destiny" idea.
To our mind, Mr. Halstead' 8 facts destroy the arguments suggested by
political fancy. The argument from tfdestiny," however, is unanswerable,
and always has been to those who believe in it. Cuba belongs by destiny
to the United States, just as Canada and Mexico do, to say nothing ot
South America; it is also part of destiny that the present owners of
these countries should vigorously resist parting with them, so that
it will probably be centuries before destiny is accomplished satisfactorily to all parties. Newspaper correspondents, however, occupy
themselves much with the future, and we are glad to know troJIl
Mr. Halstead that it will all tum out all right in the end. 2B
Forum also presented an article on the Itinevitable destiny" theme.

w.

G. Sumner, Professor of Social and Political Science at Yale University

wrote on the fallacy of territorial expansion in the June Forum.

He

explained that the traditional belief is that a state aggrandizes itself
by territorial extension, so that winning new land is gaining in wealth
and prosperity.

He maintained that there is such a thing, though, as an

expedient size for a state and that the notion that gain of territory is
gain of wealth and strength for the state, after the expedient size has

27Nation, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 235.
28Nation, LXII (June 25, 1896), p. 496.
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been won, is a delusion4

He continued his explanation, that if the United

States should admit Hawaii to the Union, the Fiscus of the former state
would collect more taxes and incur more expenses.
such that the latter would probably be the greater.

The circumstances are
But, with Cuba, he

said, if we were compelled to take the jurisdiction and establish order
and security there, it would be a great burden and possibly a fatal calamity
to us.

Sumner then concluded:

This confederated state of ours was never planned for indefinite
expansion, or for an imperial policy. • • • The Fathers of the
Republic planned a confederation of free and peaceful industrial
commonwealths, shielded by their geographical position from the
jealousies, rivalries, and traditional policies of the Old World. • • •
Any extension will not make us more secure where we are, but will
force us to take new measures to secure our new acquisitions. The
preservation of acquisitions will force us to reorganize our internal
resources, so as to make it possible to prepare them in advance and
to mobilize them with promptitude. This will lessen liberty and
require discipline. It will increase taxation and all the pressure
of government. • • • All this will be disastrous to repUblican
institutions and to democracy.29
This expansionism and imperialism then, according to Professor Sumner,
is not necessarily "inevitable destiny" or duty for the United States, but
could actually do more harm than good.
There was much controversy over annexing lands with peoples of varied
nationalities, customs, and language.

Could this really be "manifest

destiny"?
Hon. John R. Proctor, President of the United States Civil Service
Commission believed this was perfectly natural and inevitable when he said:

29W• G. Sumner, "The Fallacy of Territorial Extension, II Forum, XXI
(June, 1896), pp. 414-419.
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Having annexed possessions of France, Spain, Mexico, and Russia -with their alien peoples, customs, and laws -- and with ease incorporated them into our system, we care little whether there are
a few thousand more or less Orientals now in Hawaii. If this be
an evil, with annexation, it will prove a diminishing one: without
annexation it may become incurable.
Proctor then went on to declare more forcefully the logic and inevitableness
of this manifest destiny, when he continued in Forum:
The founders of our government understood that it was devised to
facilitate annexation of territor.y; and our past history has settled
that question. • • • Every acquisition of territory since the formation of our government has been opposed by men who seem to have had
little appreciation of the manifest destiny of our race: others
shrink with fear, lest we have not the ability to administer properly
the government of countries seeking admission into our system. 30
Murat Halstead, in an article in the same issue of Forum, returned to
the natural destiny of the United States when he spoke of Cuba and said:
It has been the plain common se~se of history that, as Spain lost by
her colonial system of regarding outlying possessions crown property,
and ruling them by martial law so she must lose Cuba in the same way.
There is no escaping the law and logic of history. If she has not
lost the island already it is only a question of time when she will
do so. And then the United States must accept the duties of destiny.3l
Later in the article, Murat again implied the inevitability of the
destiny of the United States to expand and change, when he said that we be
everlasting examples.

Thomas Jefferson saw that if the Constitution was

not equal to the occasion of the absorption of the Louisiana purchase, there
was a higher and a more fundamental law -- "our inheritance -- written over

3~on. John R. Proctor, "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World,"
Forum, XXIV (September, 1897), pp. 43, 45.
3lMurat Halstead, 'tAmerican Annexation and Armament," Forum, XXIV
(September, 1897), p. 60.
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the continent, in rivers and ranges of mountains, in plains and valleys, and
that therefore, the Constitution would have to be accommodating.

No parch-

ment can forbid the march of mankind. 1132
In an editorial of December, 1897, Nation referred to Mr. Bryce's
article in the December Forum.

Nation approved of the objection of Mr. Bryce

to annexing Hawaii because of the difficulty of governing such a country and
especially such a population.

Mr. Bryce had also said:

liThe policy of

creating great armaments and of annexing territories beyond the sea would
be. • • an un-American policy, and a complete departure from the maxims approved by long experience -

of the illustrious founders of the Republic.,,33

And Nation tried to strengthen the argument by commenting:
Now the first thing that confronts us when we done to this 'mere
matter of detail' ••• is the fact that the Hawaiian Government
confesses that the inhabitants of the islands are not capable of
governing themselves. If this is true ••• it is, or ought to be,
a fatal bar to annexation. The theory of our government, from the
Ordinance of 1787 down, has been that the expansion of the United
States was to be solely by the addition of self-governing communities
to self-governing communities. J4
This annexation then again, is not inevitable but contrary to American
principles and ideals.
Both Forum and Nation in March, 1898, referred to the duty of the
United States in regard to its relations with Cuba and Spain.

Talk of

32Ibid., p. 65.
33Rt • Hon. James Bryce t liThe Policy of Annexation for America,"
Forum, XXIV (December, 1897), p. 395.
J4Nation, LXV (December 2, 1897), p. 432.
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war and the growing bellicosity of many caused one last effort to be made
in a plea to consider the real consequences of duty.
Senator H. D. Money in Forum, commenting on the impossible conditions
that were demanded as necessary precedents to the recognition of Cuban
belligerency, felt that the whole character of the war precluded the
fulfillment of any of those conditions.

He concluded by again appealing

to our destiny and duty when he wrote:

"But a recognition of belligerency

would not accomplish our measure of duty in this matter. • • • If we look
to our duty, we cannot be indifferent to her fate.

The example of insurrec-

tion a.gainst oppression was sat by us.,,35
And Nation, in its one final plea stated:
He [the President] should bear in mind, too, that a war which the
conscience of the nation does not heart.ily support, a war which leaves
a doubt in the mind of Christian men and women whether it is right
for us to engage in it, is particularly unwise and dangerous. The
enthusiasm which the first smell of gunpowder creates will be a very
feeble reliance unless it is sustained by the conviction or substantial
citizens that we are following an imperative call to duty; that we
have weighed the consequences, and that we have well considered what
we are to do after we shall have successfully intervened in Cuba and
assumed the resnonsibility of governing it. 3b
This would not seem to be tlinevitable destiny" by Nation.

But

imperialists believed that every expansion of our territory was in
accordance with the irresistible law of growth, with its "inevitable destiny."

35Senator H. D. Money, "Our Duty to Duha," Forum, XXV (March, 1898),
p. 18.

36Nation, LXVI (March 17, 1898), p. 199.

CHAPTER IV
IDEA OF "WHITE MAN'S BURDEN"
AS SEEN IN LITERARY MAGAZINES
Along with the ideas of racism and destiny that ap!)eared in the
wri tings of the philosophers of expansion was the idea of mission.

"'!'he

doctrine of mission," ea.ys Ralph Henry Gabriel, flis a rationalization which
provides a philosophical justification for national and racial pride."l
Frederick Merk wrote:

"A truer expression of the national spirit was Mission.

This was present from the beginning of American history and is present,
clearly, today• • • • Its language was that of dedication -- dedication to
the enduring values of American civilization. ,,2
Burgess, too, felt that altruistic thought -- that the abilities of
the Anglo-Saxons were too valuable to be kept at home.

Burgess felt that

by far the large part of the surface of the globe was inhabited by populations which had not succeeded in establishing civilized states, and since
there is no human right or barbarism, the Teutonic nations were called to
carry the political civilizations of the modern world into those parts of

l~ Course g! American Democratic Thought:
Since 1815 (New York; 1940), p. 344.
2

Frederick Merk, Manifest Destinz

37

!n Intellectual History

~~ssion

(New York, 1963), p. 261.
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the world inhabited by unpolitical and barbaric races.

They must have a

colonial policy, and this, Burgess felt, was a matter not only of right but
of duty.J
Thus the expansion of the United States into backward and misgoverned
areas, which Fiske and Strong had seen as destiny, took on, in Burgess's
teaching, the character of an obligation to civilization, an altruistic
characteristic and motive.
Another spokesman for this idea of mission was Josiah Strong, who
adopted the ideas of the Social Darwinists and elaborated them in a notable
chapter in Q\n: Country:

.lli Possible Future Jm..<i Its Present Crisis. The

idealism of his message, which emphasized the historic mission of the Anglo-Saxon people, to implant in all the remote areas of the earth, the great
values of civil liberty and spiritual Christianity, was bound to appeal to
the moral sentiments of many Americans.

Religious groups throughout the

nation gradually united behind the "imperialism of righteousness."
As Strong said:

lilt is time to dismiss 'the craven fear of being

great,' to recognize the place in the world which God has given us and to
accept the responsibilities which it devolves upon us in behalf of
Christian civilization. ,.4
One of the dominant themes of the doctrine of mission as it appeared
in the periodicals was the viewpoint that this country had a mission to

JAs explained by Julius Pratt,
(New York, 1955), p. 68.

AHistory 2! United

States foreign Policy

4Josiah Strong, Expansion Under ~ World Conditions (New York, 1900),
p. 295.
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further the cause of peace.

This argument was, of course, also often used

in connection with the ideas of race and destiny, and the frequency of its
appearance in the literature of expansionism is evidence of the need that

.

was felt to clothe expansionism in the raiment of moral respectability•
Perhaps because of the powerful strain of Puritanism that was, and to a
considerable degree still is, part of the American character, the American
felt it necessary to find moral justification for his actions and the
actions of his country.

Thus the idea of an American mission to preserve

or promote peace had a strong appeal.
The Review g!. Reviews, May, 1894, declared that the United States had
a duty in the Pacific and in the Orient to open these areas to the Occident
and also to protect the weak against the strong.

Furthermore, the whole

world would approve this step and "would welcome the Stars and Stripes as
the emblem of peace and good will toward all mankind in the North Pacific. "5
Even though the idea of mission, "white man's burden," was probably
the most benevolent of the expansionist concepts, it was at times expressed
in connection with theories far removed from peace and justice.

Writing

in the American Journal g! Politics, Ethan Allen, grandson of the Revolutionary War leader, advocat.ed what he called the "right of political domain."
Under this right, said Allen, the United States could appropriate any
territory it needed.

The United States would pay a fair price but refusal

to sell would mean confiscation.

This rule, claimed Allen, would be

enforced "for the benefit of all mankind, since this nation is today the

5Review g!. Reviews, IX (May, 1894), p. 515.
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world t s almoner of the liberties our fathers gained. ,,6 It was" of course,
an expression of mission similar in its innnorality t.o the utterances of
Burgess and Mahan.

The arrogance of such statements prompted the Nation,

in October" 1895, to refer sarcastically to those who "in fine Hegelian
phrases" claim that the United States has international dutieo as well as
international rights, and who declare that the nation is "preparing to go
forth with lofty benevolence" like a Knight of the Round Table, to redress
wrongs and establish justice the world over. ,,7
In regard to the public, readiness to react to the Hawaiian and Cuban
situations can be understood in part through the displacement of feelings
of

~pathy

or social protest generated in domestic affairs; these impulses

found a. safe and satisfying release in foreign conflict.

HaWF.ii needed

the help of the United States" and it was from this altruistic motive that
the United States wanted to come to her aid.

Spain was waging a heartlesD

and inhuman war, the Cubans were portrayed as noble . .'ictims of Spanish
tyranny, and again it was the United States that must unselfishly come to
the aid of the Cuban people.

This was the "white man t s burden. It

Both Nation and Forum alluded to this altruistic motive.

In an

editorial in the February 9, 1893 issue, Nation did not consider it altruistic when one realized the inferior type of person that would come into
the governing body of the United States if Hawaii were annexed.
stated:

6110ught We To Annex Cuba?" American Journal g! Politics, VII
(July, 1895), p. 48.
7Nation, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 234.
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The population now consists of natives recentljT emerged from savagery,
speaking foreign tongues, Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese • • • •
The State Government would almost inevitably fall into the hands of
a Sugar Boss or of some other great speculator, who would fill the
Legislature tdth its own creature, and cause his own election to the
Senate in company with the kind of subordinate known as a "Me-too."
The best mode undoubtedly seems to be the mode now in operation -that is, a simple protectorate. 8
The United States then, had no obligation to "take care tl of, or
evangelize these poor inhabitants of Hawaii, and Thomas Cooley, in an
article in Forum, felt it would be more altruistic of the United States to
remain out of the affairs of Hawaii.

He did not feel that the United States

manifested true interest in the people of Hawaii when they made no attempt
to ascertain the wishes of the native population about the subject of annexation, nor of anyone else, except those who participated in the revolution. 9
Nation

agre~d

with Cooley in his view.

In an editorial commenting on

the filibustering message and treaty submitted to the Senate by the
President in the Hawaiian matter,

Nation said that the recommendation

about the islands had been made by the "plenipotentiaries" who represented
the "merest fraction of the inhabitants, whose wishes had not been manifested by a plebiscite or even consulted.
of happiness, will for them, be

who~ly

Life, liberty, and the pursuit

at the mercy of despots seated

either at Washington or at Honolulu. 1I10

8NationJ LVI (February 9, 1893), p. 96.
9Thomas M. Cooley, "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation, It Forum,
XV (June, 1893), p. 390.
10Nation, LVI (February 23, 1893), p. 136.
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Nation followed this same theme in another editorial t when it stated:
As a friend of the India.n, therefore, as one who does not contemn the
Chinese and who does have an honest respect for solemn treaty obligations even w.tth an "inferior" civilization, and who could not personally
do a mean act to the humblest of the Hawaiian aborigines, we hope
President Cleveland will study the proposal in the light of American
republican principles and of the nature of peace and war. Is it consistent to incorporate another people without a plebiscite; or having
taken a plebiscite, straightway to disinfranchise the majority of those
who participate in it? Is it lawful to go to war for this purpose?
Or is it altruistic to force one's policies on another people?

Nation very

pointedly and cleverly commented on Mr. Blrnlnt being sent for the investigation.

It continued:

"He actually plans to visit all the islands and

employ several weeks in finding out the real sentiment of the people."
Nation then concluded:
It was evidently a great mistake to send a man of such plodd.ing
methods, wh3n there were available as commissioners men of lightninglike minds, such as that of the ex-officer of the navy who told a
reporter that the "nine hours" he spent in Honolulu thoroughly
convinced him that the Hawaiians to a man were in favor of annexation. 11
There was no altruistic motive, it would seem, a.ccording to Nation, for
Minister Steven's work, as early as November, 1889, to get ready to haul
up the flag and to force annexation.

"His dispatches, from his earliest

arrival on the islands, show that he was true to the Blaine tradition ot
diplomacy, for he set to work at once interesting himself in the material
resources and possibilities of the country, looking for chances to get in
on the ground floor, tor channels of usefulness and for good things
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generally. ,,12 And Nation implied that his meant "good things" for the
United States, not the people of Hawaii.
Nation considered universal suffrage an important condition in the
altruistic motive, when in its editorial, it referred to the Tribune's
allusion to a certain "free and intelligent people" in Hawaii, whom this
wicked administration is forcing to submit to "a corrupt, idolatrous, and
barbarous despotism. If

Nation regretted that the Tribune did not say of

what this "free and intelligent II people consisted.

It hoped it was not

possible that it consisted of the 637 white Americans resident in the
capital in a total registered vote of 13,593, and that the term excluded
the bulk of the population simply because they were native-born and colored.
Nation continued:
If this should prove true, we should all die of shame. • • • We
take it for granted that the Tribune means the native born citizens
of Hawaii, without distinction of race or color, and that it is
under the impression, formed through misleading reports, that they
are furiously opposed to the ~ueen's government and would overthrow
it but for Secretary Gresham and Mr. Blount. When it learns the
true state of the case, it will come round, and will denounce the
prejudice against color just as we do, and demand an equal voice in
the government for the colored Hawaiians as it does for the colored
Americans. 1 3
This alone would be the "white man's burden" toward the Hawaiian people,
according to Nation.

A truly altruistic act on Congress's part in dealing

with the Hawaiian problem would be the taking of a popular vote.
does not allow, Nation stated:

l2Ibid., (May 11, 1893), p. 338.
l3Nation, LVII (November 16, 1893), p. 359.
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• • • the policy ot allowing a handtul ot white traders to set up
a government without consulting the main body ot the people. • • •
[It] would be strongly condemned by both parties, and especially
by the kepuhlican party arrayed against a popular vote on account
ot the color ot the bulk ot the voters, seeing that it was it which
embodied in our Constitution that tamous clause which says that the
right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United Sta.tes
or any State, on account ot race, color, or any previous condition
ot servitude. fl14
Nation continued this line ot thought in an editorial in a later issue.
It again reterred to the illiteracy ot the people ot Cuba and then implied
how Cuba was thus not ready tor independence, republican institutions, or

tor becoming a State in the Union.

Nation continued:

"What delightful

colleagues tor Lodge and Morgan in the Senate would Cuba turnish1

With

heart beating true to sugar and tobacco and all other good things in sight,
they would seem to be toreordained to seats in the Senate; and Senator
Proctor's objections to receiving them MUst be set down to advancing age,
the pharisaic spirit, and blindness to manitest destiny.II15

Nation thus

linked its reaction against the imperialists' ideas of "manifest destiny"
with its reaction against their understanding of "White man's burden."
The anti-imperialist, like the imperialist, was interested less in international humanitarianism than in his own nation.

The concern was always in

regard to what effect this imperial policy would have upon the country,
this joining of peoples so unlike those of the United States, this racial
disqualification for selt-government.

14Ibid., (December 14, 1893), p. 443.
l5Ibid., LX (April 25, 1895), p. 320.

45
The Hawaiian "failure" was not, according to Nation, that the President's
plan of undoing the wrong committed in t.he name of the Government had fa.iled,
or that the provisional government of Hawaii was still in power, and that
the (.lueen was still deprived of the throne from which she had been pushed by
an illegal use of United States forces.

But the plan that really failed,

stated Nation, was that we did not:
• • • express our national love of justice and regard for the weak and
wronged. • • • If anything has failed, it has been the simple purpose
of the President to carry out a fundamental principle of Christianity.
But it is of the nature of a fine and just action that its merit and
real success reside in the intention, not in the execution. • • • When
the history of this Hawaiian affair comes to be written, atter the
partisan clamor has died out, it will be seen that Mr. Cleveland struck
a fine note of patriotism and justice. 16
Nation praised Senator Proctor as a man for good Americans to keep
their eyes on, as he did not agree with Lodge, Frye, and Cullom in hoping
for a war with Spain so that "we may have an opportunity to annex Cuba."
Nation then very cleverly and with heavy sarcasm explained;
The character of the population, he [Senator Proctor] adds, is not
such as he would consider desirable in a State of the Union, and a
State Cuba would necessarily become, he thinks, if annexed. Now it
is hard to sit down with a United States Senator and point out to
him what Lodge says every intelligent schoolboy knows. • • • Does not
Mr. Proctor know that intense Americans never ask how we are to govern
distant islands and mongrel races after we get them? • • • Besides,
does not Mr. Proctor know what the instantaneous effect of American
institutions upon alien peoples is certain to be? Can he not see
them becoming, at first contact with our politics, industrious and
sober studeniA of the constitution, enemies of corruption, good
Republicans? ·f

l6Ibid., LVIII (February 8, 1894), p. 97.
l7Ibid., LX (March 28, 1895), p. 229.
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Nation thus ridiculed the so-called 'Iwhite man's burden" taken on by
Lodge and Frye and Cullom and President Harrison.

Nation considered proper

government of the islands part of the "white man' s burden."
In regard to the uprising in Cuba, Clarence King, in an article in
Forum, held that it was the duty of the United States to make a decision to
help either Spain or Cuba, and then concluded that it was our "burden" to
decide only one way.

Our record toward Spain is clear. • • • Is it difficult for us to
decide between free Cuba and tyrant Spain? Why not fling overboard Spain and give Cuba the aid which she needs, and which our
treaty with Spain cannot prevent? Which cause is morally right? Which is manly? -- Which is American?lS
Nation also referred to the Spanish tyranny in Cuba, but it did not
agree with King's conclusion.

Nation cited some of the oppression and

tyranny in taxes, customs, and duties, but then explained that the adminietration of Cuba had distinctly improved in the last thirty years; and
that the men responsible for the idea that Spain was a cruel monster were
simply outsiders with no real interest in the people of Cuba.

Nation felt

it was not the "burden" of the United States to interfere in Cuban affairs
because "the great mass of property owners and business men see their
truest interest in the continuance of Spanish control.,,19
Henry Cabot Lodge's conception of the "sacred trust" apparently
resolved itself into the moral principle that the welfare of the heathen

l8C1arence King, "Shall Cuba Be Free?" Forum, XX (September, 1895),
p. 319.
19Nation, LX (April 25, 1895), p. 319.
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is sacred.

The crowning element in Lodge's moral philosophy was a doctrine

of the "burden. 'I

In speaking of the duty of the United States to Cuba, in

an article in Forum, Lodge stated his viewpoint when he wrote:
That which makes action imperative on the part of the United States
in regard to Cuba, rests on a higher ground than any of these. Such
a war as is now being waged in Cuba - unrestrained by any of the
laws of civilized warfare and marked by massacre and ferocious
reprisals at every step -- is a disgrace to civilization. • • •
The interests of humanity are the controlling reasons which demand
the beneficent interposition of the United States to bring to an
end this savage war and give to the island peace and independence ••••
We have a responsibility with regard to Cuba. We cannot evade it • • • •
If one Administration declines to meet our national responsibilities
as they should be met, there will be put in power another Administration
which will neither neglect nor shun its plain duty to the United States
and to the cause of freedom and humanity.20
John Bassett Moore, Professor of International Law at Columbia University,
did not agree with Lodge in his plea for the Cubans, as to the duty and burden
of the United States to the cause of humanity.

He did not approve recog-

nizing Cuban belligerency, did not teel it would benefit the Cuban ineurgents.

He also pictured the illiterate population, the undeveloped politi-

cal capacity, and the tendency of the people for constant wars and revolutions.

It was not the burden of the United States to aid them, because, as

he said:
These facts. • • furnish matter tor serious reflection as to our
future relations to Cuba, when it is proposed to intervene for the
purpose of expelling the government of Spain. And it Spain should
be expelled by our aid, and, at the close ot the war, the island
should remain, as probably would be the case, in our possession,

20Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Duty to Cuba,n Forum, XXI (May, 1896),
pp. 286-287.
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it is doubtful whether the confidence of the world in the benevolence of our motives would be strong enough to save us from the
imputation of having committed a wiltu1 act of spo1iation. 21
Another Who felt that the majority ot the people were not capable ot
se1t-government and who te1t also that it was not part ot our burden to
extend our American institutions was James Bryce.
he wrote:

In the December Forum

nOne sometimes hears it said that her mission is to spread

democratic principles.

Polynesians and Asiatics, Creole Spaniards and

mulattoes are not tit to receive those princip1es w

Neither are negroes

tit, as the history of Haiti and of most of the South American so-called
'republics' proves.,,22
Altruism was again pointed out by Henri Rochefort, editor of
L' Intrapsigeant, when he wrote in FOM ot the sympathy of the French

people for the Cubans and then concluded:
How much more actively ought these sympathies to manitest themselves
in the great American republic, which, but its proximity, as well as
by economic interests, is bound to Cuba, and which certainly has not
forgotten in a century the history of its struggles for its own independence • • • Who is the adversary? • • • It is the power, at
once imbecUe and tyrannous, that disseminates everywhere anger and
revolt - - in the Philippine Islands as well as in Cuba - - after
having caused the whole ot Latin America to rise up against it.
Between republican Cuba and monarchical Spain can t!'!ose hesitate to
believe in the meaning of the words "progress," "liberty," and
"humanity? lt23

21John Bassett Moore, "The ,<uestion of Cuban Belligerency," Forum,
XXI (May, 1896), pp. 298-299.
22at. Hon. James Bryce, "The Policy ot Annexation tor America," Forum,
XXIV (December, 1897), p. 394.
23Henri Rochefort, "The United States and Cuba," Forum, XXIII
(April, 1897), pp. 156-157.
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And later in the same article, he even more pointedly stated the
meaning of the "white man t 15 burden."

He wrote:

"The great American republic

holds in its hands the destiny of an oppressed people, whose heroism and
patriotic sacrifices have rendered it a hundred times worthy of liberty.
Will the United States decline to speed the hour of justice? The cause
of the Cuban insurgents is that of Humanity. ,,24
In reaction

ag~inst

the imperialist idea of the great civilizing and

protecting mission ot the United States, Nation

r~ferred

to those people

who talk about not shrinking selfishly and timidly within the narrow bonds
of the United States, but feel that the countr,y should go forth and redress
the wrongs of other countries and rescue the oppressed.

But Nation felt

that the mission was, as it stated:
• • • a grandiose conception, but there is nothing grandiose about
the missionaries who are to execute it. What they have in their
minds is a remorseless trampling upon native rights, opportunities tor
personal enrichment, readiness to pick a quarrel with ever,y nation
that gets in their way, and an era of general national extravagance
and waste and oppressive taxation. That... is what the benevolent
mission ot the United States will come to a.n execution - - its
tender mercies proving cruel - - and that is the end to which the
Hawaiian beginning will surely conduct us. 25
Furthermore, in the talk again of Hawaiian annexat:ion, Na.tion did not
feel that the economic interest for the Islands should enter, but that
only a high moral plane should be the basis in discussing annexation.
with a "t.ongue in the cheek" remark, it stated:

24 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
25Nation, LXIV (June 17, 1897), p. 448.

Then

"It is \'llell if all this

is now removed from the debate and if it can aga.in dwell upon the lofty
morality of 3,000 aliens giving away the territory and sovereignty of
97,000 natives and residents. n26
Again, just as earlier, Nation felt that it was a misunderstood
"white man's burden" that would force institutions and governments on a
people, not allowing them the freedom of choice by voting.

As it said

in an editorial:
••• many well-meaning people have been deceived with the idea that
we are delivd~ing a people from monarchical tyranny and substituting
republican government instead, thereof, whereas we are doing the very
opposite thing, if the first words of our Declaration of Independence
are a true definition of republican institutions ••• It we were
disposed to do equal and exact justice, we should allow the
Hawaiians to vote on the question of having a Queen, if they want one,
but that, we acknowledge, is now impracticable. It is not
impracticable to allow them to vote on the question of annexation. 27
Murat Halstead appealed to the altruistic feeling in the September
Forum, in writing about American annexation and armament, when he wrote:
"We have assumed a protectorate ot Hawaii, and for the second time, urge
a treaty ot anner..ation ot those islands.

We have cb.imed rights as a

humane Power, with faith in self-government, and a consciousness of the
manifest destiny, to do the things counting tor freedom and peace and the
extension ot our just infiu.ence in Cuba. ,,28
In two issues in Karch, Nation criticized the enlightened seU-interest

26Ibid., LXV (October 7, 1897), pp. 270-271.
27Ibid., (November 25, 1897), p. 410.

2~urat Halstead, "American Annexation and Armament, It Forum, XXIV
(September, 1897), p. 65.
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of the imperialists and appealed to the moral point of view.
editorial, Nation asked:

In its

"Are we morally ready for war with Spain?

Have

we a cause of war so clear, so loftily imperative that all the hideousness

of camage and the fearful blow to civic progress must be hazarded in order
to vindicate humanity and righteousness.,,29
And in the next issue, NatioQ sadly admitted:

"In fact, these open

avowals of readiness to kill people and destroy property for purposes of
private gain were probably the most grotesque outcome of Christianity and
civilization that the Westem world has ever had, and it has had many. "30
Later in the same article, Nation admitted and acknowledged the
necessity of war under certain circumstances, "if there is no other reason,
in order that the higher civilization, which in our day is apt to find its
expression in superior strength, shall have its due influence in the ordering of human affairs.")!
But Forum again took a different position.

In the March issue,

Senator Money regretted that two administrations had given but slight
recognition to the public sentiment of the people to come to the succor
of the Cubans.

He explained that thirteen consuls of the United States in

Cuba had truthfully portrayed the dreadful conditions of the island; yet
the official representations had not affected the policy of the Presidents

29Natlon, LXVI (March 24, 1898), p. 218.
3OIb1d., (March 31, 18<)8), p. 238.

31 Ibid.
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and Cabinets.

He appealed to the responsibility of Americans to humanity

when he concluded:

"The truth is, that the bond and stock market is today

the most potent factor in the government of nations; and the men who compose
it care but little for the general business ot the mass of the people, for
liberty, tor religion, or for humanity. "32
This spirit of the heavily emotional "White man's burden" was used by
imperialists and anti...imperialists alike.

It was used for Hawaii, Samoa,

Cuba, and the Philippines.

It was used up to the very climax itse1t, when

McKinley found his answer -

that "there was nothing left for us to do but

to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and
Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as
our fellow-men tor whom Christ also died. ,,33 It was used thus as a motive
or pattern forming the basis for this new imperialism ot 1898 -

this

motive or pattern of the "white man's burden. II

32Senator H. D. Money, 'tOur Duty to Cuba," Forum,
p. 24.
33C. S. Olcott, ~
New York, 1916), p. 111.

MJ:t 2!.

xx.v

(March, 1898)

William McKinley, Vol. II (Boston and

CHAPTER V

PORTRAYAL OF "SELF-DEFENSE" IDEA
IN LITERARY MAGAZINES

There can be little doubt, in light ot the analysis thus tar presented,
that ideological and religious considerations stand in the tront rank among
those factors that composed the pattern of American expansionism during the
years 1893-1898.
by

However, these considerations present a pattern that is

no means complete; hardly less dignificant is the large body of

expansionist sentiment which centered around the revival of interest in the
United States Navy, in self-defense and 8ecurity.

The new imperialists ot

1898 used the principle of national defense as an important motive in their

expan8ionist undertakings.
The naval revival of the eighties and nineties did not result entirely
from economic and political considerations, nor from the influence of a few
individuals.

Important also were the psychological element8 underlying

these other factors.

The expansion of the navy resulted partly from a

growing national consciousness and national pride, from natural combativeness, assertiveness, and greed, from a feeling of interiority made acute by
the wide gap

~ich

separated American naval progress from that of the great

world powers.

53

54
It is also likely that a teeling of tear dictated an expansion of the
navy during these years.

Naval expansion was to a large degree based upon

strategic considerations, upon a desire to strengthen the nation's detenses.
This emphasis upon detense stemmed to some extent trom a feeling of insecurity,
anxiety, and fear.

This emotion was part17 natural and sincere, arising

out of the realities of this country's naval weakness, and partly sympathetic,
resulting from the propaganda ot the expansionists, who, if they did not
create this teeling, certainly fostered it and played upon it tor their own
purposes.

Whatever the explanation, this emotion was a basic part of the

psychological background of naval expansion.
The United States needed Hawaii, according to the imperialists, either
as annexed territory or a protectorate, .and ot the two, annexation was
much to be fr,:;ferred.

The American press urged the self-defense argument

because of alleged or real British intrigue in Honolulu.
Selt-deiense or national security gained great support through Alfred
Mahan.

He iJJDediately manifested concern over Hawaii and our sea power in

the March issue ot Forum.

He spoke of the value ot any naval position, and

then reterred all this to the Hawaiian group.

He concluded:

From the foregoing considerations may be interred the importance
of the Hawaiian Islands as a position powerfully influencing the
commercial and military control of the Pacific, and especially of
the northern Pacific, in which the United States, geographically,
has the strongest right to assert hersell. These are the main
aci:ra.ntage s, which can be termed positiVe : those, namelr' which
directly advance commercial security and naval control.
1

Alfred T. Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum, XV
(March, 1893), p. 7.
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In addition, Mahan discussed acquisition by a foreign power:
To the negative advantages of possession, by removing conditions,
which, if the islands were in the hands of any other power, would
constitute to us disadvantages and threats, allusion only will be
made. The serious menace to our Pacific coast and our Pacific trade,
if so important a position were held by a possible ene~, has been
frequently mentioned in the press and dwelt upon in the diplomatic
papers which are from time to time given to the public. Upon one
particular, too much stress cannot be laid • • • the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling station well
within twenty-five miles. 2
Mahan's views were debated by the Nation.

It refused to accept

Mahan' s reasoning and used counter-arguments rejecting his premises.

Nation

felt that Mahan wrote almost purely as a naval tactician and that he made
out the Hawaiian Islands to be of great strategic importance, if a naval
war of tremendous proportions were to break out.

But, Nation insisted:

"All this may be freely admitted without allowing it to be a reason of any
force whatever in favor of annexation."

It went on to argue that in the

first place, it would be a departure from all that is traditional and all
that is best or necessary in the policy of this country, to make any plans
whatever for such a contingency as Captain Mahan contemplated.

The

editorial maintained that the people of the United States would reject this
idea that one's country must embark upon these warlike adventures in order
to become a naval Power of the first rank.

So, Nation felt, any privileges

in the way of a coaling station or naval stores, the United States either
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had at their disposal or could be had for the asking.3

No change is

necessary for self-defense or in the name of "vital interest," according to
Nation's conclusions.
In another editorial, Nation similarly rejected any change being
necessary in the management of the islands.

To Nation, there was no

question of self-defense or of vital interest as seen by the imperialists.
Americans had governed the islands during most of the time since they had
possessions on the Pacific Coast.

And, as Nation stated:

"We have been

spared the trouble of fortifying them and keeping a large naval force in
those waters and settling their private quarrels • • • As other nations
have respected our wishes in the matter in the past, they would respect
them in the future all the more as our powr to command respect increases
with revolving years. ,.4
Nation repeated this argument and plea for status S22 further in the
February 16th issue.

In it, Nation, like Forum, linked foreign imperialism

or intrusion with the islands.

It explained that the treaty of 1875, and

extended in 1887, gave the United States "everything we want -

free trade

with the islands, a coaling station, and complete protection against every
description of foreign intrusion • • •

Th~re

is therefore, not the slightest

occasion for any kind of precipitate action. lt5 There would seem to be no
real basis then for the self-defense idea, according to Nation, at this time.

. 3Nation, LVI (March 2, 1893), p. 154.
4Ibld. (February 2, 1893), p. 75.
5Ibiq• (March 9, 1893), pp. 173-174.
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Mahan's contention that a large navy was necessary for the growth of
the United States was again questioned by several editorials and
in Nation.

a~~icles

In the March 9th editorial, Nation was aware of the truth of

Mahan's thought as presented in the Harch Forum -- that Hawaii had value
as a coaling station, in case the United States were at war with another
great naval Power in the Pacific Ocean.

It also realized the difficulty

which possession of it would be to a rival or

ene~.

But -- it pointed

out, that Mahan's whole argument was based on the assumption that the United
States was to have a navy as large and as powerful as the navies of France
and England put together.

As Nation said:

• • • to make Hawaii of use to us as a coaling station in a war with
Great Britain ••• we must have a navy large enough not only to
protect our coasting trade and our cities on the Atlantic and the
Pacific from the assaults of British cruisers, bgt to make British
cruisers afraid to go near the Sandwich ISlands.
This was Naval politics that Natiol1 viewed warily.

Again, in the

March 16th issue, in an item called "Armed Evangelists," Nation spoke out
against the need of a navy.

It again conceded that it would be well to

have a respectable navy for the defense of the coasts and the patrol of the
seas, and the protection of United States ci-tizens in "semi-civilized
countries," but it would not be well to

h~ve

such a navy made the nucleus

of an enormous sea force, to be "played for all its worth" at every
Presidential election. 7

6Ibid., (February 16, 1893), p. 115.

7Ibid., (March 16, 1893), p. 191.

Forum, in June, 1893, presented the views of Thomas Cooley, President
of the American Bar Association, against Hawaiian annexation.

Cooley

rejected not only the self-defense argument, but also the foreign imperialism
-- the fear that if we did not take them Great Britain would. 8 Nation
pointed out the false impression given or spread by the imperialists that
England wanted the islands, the "FUiglish scare" that the United States had
to prevent foreign imperialism with concern for her own security and vital
interest. 9 James Schouler, lawyer and historian, in Forum, also brushed
aside the fear of British or other foreign interference to seize the islands
if the United States did not.10
The security and vital interest theme were again criticized by Nation
in 1894.

In the first section of one of its articles, Nation struck out

againat the "well-known Jingoism" of Chairman Morgan of the Senate Committee,
reporting in relation to the Hawaiian Islands.

Nation irritably stated:

Incidentally he [Senator Morgan] tried to please everybody concerned
in the Hawaiian affair, with the natural result of pleasing nobody;
but his main intent was to make hia report a powerful argument for
a big navy, and the Nicaragua Canal, and coaling stations thick aa
blackberries, and general bumptiousness and insolence in foreign
affairs. ll

8

Thomas M. Cooley, "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation, If Forum,
XV (June, 1893), p. 392.
9Nation, LVII (November 16, 1893), p. 362 and (November 23, 1893), p. 384.
10James Schouler, "A Review of the Hawaiian Controversy," Forum, XVI
(February, 1894), pp. 670-675.
llNation, LVIII (April 19, 1894), p. 284.

59
Nearly all of the officers who were examined by Senator Morgan agreed with
that terror of the world's navies, that the United States cannot be too
quick about preparing for a naval war in the Pacific and

forti~ng

Pearl

Harbor, as the true way of bringing to naught the craft and power on an
enemy's ships -

"say British ships," as the Alabama Senator innocently

remarked, and Nation ridiculed. 12
But later in the same article, Nation referred to the most "luminous
and cogent" views of Commander Houston, who held that:
• • • in time of war and without a navy equal or nearly equal to
that of the greatest naval power, the possession of the Hawaiian
Islands would be a source of weakness rather than strength • • •
We should ultimately have to let them go • • • after having wasted
a lot of money.1J
As to the likelihood that the United States would authorize the creation
of a great naval force, Houston thought that a calm inquiry as to the
attitude of Congress and the country on that question would show the thing
to be

80

improbable that one need seek no further tor reasons for not

acquiring the islands.

Nation approved of his rejection ot the naval

theme.
Nation respected Captain Mahan as an authority, but it rejected his
constant demand for naval power.

It criticized Mahan who had evaluated

the naval programme of Earl Spencer ot England.

l2Ib1d ., p. 285.

IJIbid ., p. 286.

Nation commented on this:
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• • • he did say that a strong naval force was important, more now
than ever, for Britain • • • because of her foreign possessions.
Then this author Mahan comments how it may be good for national
pride, but it is also very inconvenient and that many Englishmen
would not enter into the "British Empire M as a programme now today.
• • • Nevertheless, i t our naval officers had their way, Capt.
Mahan included, they would load us with similar responsibilities,
in the shape of outlying dependencies, posts, garrisons, and
coaling stations, without a particle of the excuse which England
had for her expans10n.14
Later, Nation again alluded to Captain Mahan and stated:

"In short,

the new school of naval experts, with their great learning and scientific
attainments, tends distinctly to throw an unreal glamour about war, and to
make it little else than a beautiful demonstration of mathematical theses
or problema in mechanica or ballistics."

In proof, it concluded:

"It

anyone is yet in doubt about the way the growth of the navy itself has
fostered a warlike spirit among us, and made it seem a light thing to go
to war, he need only look at the effect of the new navy on the last two
secretaries of the deparbaent. n15 Nation cited Secretary Tracy and
Secretary Herbert as being phMged persons, thinking only of war and
deatruction. 16 Security and vital interest were excuses in this constant
naval power theme, all rejected by Nation.
Nation was by no means convinced of the danger of foreign imperialism
either.

It criticized those agencies and individuals who were twisting

14Nation, LVIII (May 17, 1894), p. 357.
l5Ibid., LIX (November 8, 1894), p. 337.
l6Ibid., LX (April 18, 18<)5), p. 292.
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the truth.

It spoke of the latest news in this regard, that "if Great

Britain neglected her opportunity to grasp the islands, the danger of
Japan's seizing them increases,"

Jingoism, it seemed, had taken possession

of certain Japanese politicians, hence Nation concluded that they had
their Morgans and Lodges and Fr,yes, a stern rebuke to the supporters of
the "security and vital interest tl theme of the expansionists. 17
Lodge proved his support of this theme by his article in the March
Forum.

He very strongly insisted:

With England reaching out for every island in the Pacific, and with
British sympathy strongly manifested for the royalist government,
this administration hae done everything in its power to breRk
down our well-settled policy in regard to theBe islands, which
are so essential to us, both cODlllercia1ly and from a military
point of view. 18
The danger of foreign imperialism was a basis for expansionism declared
necessary by Lodge.
Nation again in 1896, in its editorial, questioned the need for a
large navy.

A.s it insisted:

"The navies of the great naval Powers are

meant to carry on wars with each other, which their past history and
experience lead them to exist."

But Nation maintained, there did not

exist in the case of the United States a single one of the reasons which
excused the large navies in Europe.
possessions.

As it proved:

"We have no foreign

We have no interest in European quarrels.,,19 And in the

l7Ibid., LX (April 18, 1895), p. 292.
18Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," Forum, XIX
(March, 1895), p. 8.
19Nation, LX (February 13, 1896), p. 138.
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following editorial, it re-iterated this lack of the danger of foreign
imperialism and this lack of a need .for a great navy, when it stated:
The stories and news agencies invent every now and then of a
determination ot Great Britain to assume a bellicose attitude toward
us, by purchasing Cuba from Spain, or seizing Hawaii from the
missionaries, are childishly silly. There is nothing which practical
men in Europe view with more wonderment than our naval preparations
and our apparent desire to fight somebody.20
The Commander of the first Naval Battalion, J. W. Miller wrote an
article tor Forum.

He stated his case tor preparing for the security and

vital interest ot the United States when he said that the only necessar,y
thing was to tace the fact that the country was earnestly convinced ot
the vital importance ot a policy, called "Monroe It or

It

jingo, II it did not

matter -- the policy that no European power shall enlarge its territory
on the continent without the consent of the United States. 21 Commander
Miller then went on to suggest that Congress begin a system ot coast
defenses and the construction of more battleships, the tormation ot a
General Staff, more ships and troops -- in other words, anything necessary
for the selt-detense and security of the United States. 22
Henry Cabot Lodge once more made his views known in Forum, this time
on the duty ot the United States to Cuba.

He appealed to the motive ot

vital interest specifically, and he upbraided the present administration
20

l!2i5!.,

(February 20, 1896), p. 152.

2lJ • W. Miller, "Rumors ot War and Resultant Duties," Forum, XXI
(April, 1896), pp. 238-239.
22Ibid., p. 240.
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when he wrote:

"Evllry Administration, until we reach the one now in

power, has declared in the plainest terms to the government of Spain and
to the -world that the condition of Cuba was a matter in which tho United
States had a vital interest. ,,23
imperialism he continued:

Then appealing to the danger of foreign

"Every reasonable man who gives any thought

to this subject will admit that the fate of Cuba is of great importance to
the United States; that under no circumstances should we permit Spain to
transfer the island to any other European power."
"Vital interest" was again appealed to in Forum by Senator Cullom.
He pointedly stated:

"If ever it happens that the era of oppresoion and

bloodshed shall cease in Cuba, and that the United States shall possess
that rich gem of the West Indies • • • it will be because we are bound
to protect the interests of the United States by Ocean and Gulf wherever
those interests develop themselves.,,24
Nation was again attacking the foreign imperialism scare in December,

1896. It commented on the fact that Ex-Secretary Foster was back from
Hawaii with his arguments again, and that he had one conclusive argument
in reserve:

"If the islands are not annexed by the United States they

will be by some other of the great Powers."

But Nation tried to assure

itself, "this appoal to self interest is not clear, was so overworked four

23z.octge, "Our Duty to Cuba, It Forum, XXI (May, 1896), pp. 279-280.
24Senator S. M. Cullom, "Blunders of a Democratic Administration,"
Forum, XXI (August, 1896), p. 719.
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years

a~,

and has become so ludicrous by lapse of t.ime, that we do not

look to see it have much effect on a country and a Congress that show
signs of being decidedly weary of Hawaii. u25
The islands were seen by various newspapers and periodicals, such as
Washington ~, San Francisco Evening Bulletin, and Review

2! Reviews,26

as a "key to the Pacific" in this theme of self-defense and vital interest.
But this enthusiasm was, however, not unanimous.
cals

as~ed

Some papers and periodi.

a cautious or hostile attitUde from the beginning.

Nation, a.s was seen, was one of these periodicals.

By May, 1897, it

was writing sha.rply and pointedly against this argument of "key to the
Pacific," of vital interest and defense.

Commenting on a lecture for

Hawaiian annexation by Mr. John Foster it upbraided Mr. Foster
••• who pins his faith mainly to the theory which has such a
peculiar fascination for cert.ain minde, that the islands constitute
the "key to the Pacific, If and therefore If!. lI:l.I:k .b!!!! .tJl!.m arrmow.
As he tells us himself, that they stand at the center of an otherwiae unoccupied circle of water having a radius ot about two thousand miles, one may be pardoned tor suggesting that the key does
not seem to fit the hole, and that after going to the trouble ot
securing it we might tind it incapable of turning the lock.
It then went on to criticize the key idea as a palpable absurdity, insulting
to the intelligence of the people of the United States, pointing out that
'tif the island stood in the middle of a passageway of only moderate width
eo that their occupation could be made effective for the purpoee of blockiug the way against the vessels of othar nations, then they might be called

25Nation, LXIII (December 3, 1896), p. 1~3.

26San Francisco Evening Bulletin, (January, 1893), Washington Post,
(January 30, 1893), Review 91. Reviews, VII (March, 1893), pp. 13l-l~
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the IIkey to the Pacific. II

But. it reasoned, even in tha.t case the duty

of the United 0tatos to acquire them would have been far from clear because
an international guarantee of the freedom of such a passage would have
been of greater value than the exclusive ownership, with the ensuing
necessity of expensive fortifications and the increased danger of bloody
complications with other Powe~a.27
Passing on from the key idea, Nation brought in the foreign imperialism
and self-defense theme again in 1897. and accused Foster of waIlting the
islands for the purpose of securing this outpost of the Pacific frontier,
and thus protecting the future mighty commerce and rapidly growing
interests on that coast from the encroachments of the great Powers striving
for ascendancy in that quarter of the globe.

Again Nation rejected this

logic when it argued:
one remembers that it takes a fast steamer about five days
to reach any point of our coast from Honolulu, the idea of the
islands as a defense is on a par in absurdity with the key idea.
• • • As a matter of course a little group of islands, incapable of
supporting from its own resources a. population large enough to
furnish more than a mere handful of fighting men, could never
add anything to the defensive strength ot the nation owning it.
unless its position commanded some necessary avenue of approach. 28
~ben

And, Nation concluded, in the present case the United States would be merely
adding another point to be defended, and very difficult of deftlnse at that.
if the

Unit~d

States ever engaged in a war in the Pacific.

27Nation, LXIV (May 6, 1897), p. 332.
28Ibid., p. 333.
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The myth of foreign imperialism was again the focal point of Nation's
remarks, when it very sarcastically stated some arguments in favor of
annexation.

"It the United States does not 'grab' the islands,

As it said:

the Japanese will.

They already outnumber the Americans greatly, they are

increasing rapidly, they are titted tor the climate and tor its industries,
and their destiny is so much more manitest than ours that it will prevail
it we delay any longer.

The presentation ot these reasons should appeal

torcibly to the sense of justice which distinguishes the American people.,,29
One ot Forum's writers agreed with the views of Nation.

Senator

\Vhite used some ot the arume arguments that Nation had used in its
editorial.

~~y

6th

He tirst denied the contention that the United States had to

have ,the islands tor purposes ot protection or selt-defense.

He telt that

the United States could make a better contest without than with Hawaii.
It the United States accomplished annexation for detensive purposes it
would have to fortity the new domain and build a navy capable ot sustaining
it.

Senator White, pointed out that the naval strength of the United

States was increasing very slowly, while leading EuropM.n competitors were
acting with more alacrity.
Senator

~'Jhite

also reviewed the desire ot other countries to acquire

Hawaii and in this he stated:

29Ibid., LXV (July 15, 1897), p.,,' 39.
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But it is urged that England, in case of trouble, may seize Honolulu,
and that the ~apanese may do so. England clearly will not operate
against us from Honolulu. She has a veritable Gibraltar at Esquimault
on the Washington boundary. Why should she divert and divide her
strength by permitting her guns to rust two thousand miles from her
enemey, especially when she is splendidly equipped at a point within
sight of the smoke of our civilization? For more than forty years
England has denied any hostility to Hawaii.30
Senator

h~ite

continued point by point to reject all the demands and reason-

ings of the annexationist8.

He insisted that we did not need the Islands

to defend the Nicaraguan Canal, as the western terminus would not have been
better protected by guns mounted at Hawaii than by those which guard the
Golden Gate.

Also, the battleships of the United States could be dispatched

from California to Nicaragua more speedily than from Honolulu.

So, to

annex the Hawaiian Islands, Senator White maintained would weaken, not
strengthen our military position or self-defense.
Nation was happy to cite the President of the Hawaiian Republic,
Mr. Dole, on the theme of foreign imperialism.

Mr. Dole hac denied the

Bureau's idea that if the United States refused to annex the islands,
then the Republic would offer itself to any of the Powers which stood
waiting to see what the United States did about the matter.
contended that the Republic would simply
willingly added:

"This admission

was

go

on as before.

Mr. Dole
And Nation

hard for Hatch, the Hawaiian Minister

in vlashington to bear. 1t3l
Annexationists brought forward the testimony of military and naval
30
Senator Stephen M. ~ihite, "The Proposed Annexation of Hawaii,"
Forum, XXIII (August, lSCn), pp. 724-726.

31

Nation, LXVI (January 27, 1898), p. 52.
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experts.

In his plea for Hawaii as a coaling station and port, Hon. John

Proctor referred to Mahan who had likened a modern warship without coal
"to a wingless bird." Proctor then went on to sa,.:
In the possession of a hostile power, Hawaii would give an additional
base for coaling and repair trom which to attack our extended coastline. With Hawaii in our possession, and Pearl Harbor fortified
and stored with coal -- furnishing a safe harbor tor our merchantmen -- we need fear no attack from a cross the Pacific. We should
require fewer war ships in the Pacific, and fewer fortifications on
our Western and Alaskan coasts, than would be required if Hawaii
should remain in its present condition or pass to the possession
ot a foreign Power. 32
In competition with this ambitious program of aggressive foreign
policy and territorial expansion, was James Bryce's article in the December
issue of the Forum.

He wrote, he stated, from an American point of view,

and maintained very strongly that Great Britain had no direct interest in
the fortunes of either

Cuba

or Hawaii.

Going on to the argument most

frequently used in the United States for the annexation of

Cuba

and Hawaii,

that insisting on the strategic strength gained to American by their annexation, Bryce immediately brushed it aside.

It had been said that the Island

would give the United States two points of naval vantage -

one commanding

the Caribbean Sea and the other the Eastern Pacific, thus protecting her
southern and western coasts.

Bryce argued that the United States was

exceptionally strong in this position already.

He then questioned it it

would be worth while for the United States to build and maintain a navy that
would be necessary if the United States wanted to defend the islands.

He

3~on. John R. Proctor t "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World,"
Forum, XXIV (December, 1897), pp. 386-388.
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admitted disagreement with the views of Captain Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt
in their plea tor a strong navy.

He concluded by observation that.it there

were any torce in these considerations, it followed that the annexation of
either Cuba or Hawaii would be a source not of strength but ot weakness.
America did not want to see either island fall into the hands of any
possible naval

ene~,

but, Br,yce concluded, neither is threatened with any

such danger, and the expression ot the feelings of the United States would
be sufficient at any time to avert it. 33
Senator Morgan, in the March issue of the Forum, answered Mr. Bryce's
questioning attitude on the wisdom of the United States in desiring to
annex the Hawaiian Islands. Mr. Morgan proved its wisdom especially in
pointed out the necessity of the Islands as held by the opinions and
reports ot sldlled and experienced officers of the

Army

and Navy "who

declare that Hawaii is indispensable to the protection of our western coast."
He held that self-defense was a basis for the annexation of the islands. 34
Daniel Agnew, ex-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Penns,ylvanla,
in Forum, gave a lesalist's view against an aggressive foreign policy and
territorial expansion.

He disregarded the argument that precedents were

cited to justify annexation, and concluded that precedents did not amend
the Constitution.

His advice was:

coasts and defend our ports!

"If we fea.r foreign nations, arm our

If we need a harbor or coaling station,

33Rt. Hon. James .Bryce f "The Pollcy of Annexation for America, If
Forum, XXIV (December, 1897), pp. 386-388.
34Senator John T. Morgan, "The Duty of Annexing Hawaii," Forum, XXV
(March, 1898), pp. 14-15.
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secure it by treatyl

If these be assailed, defend them by force of arms,

as we do other rights! ,,35

tJeither security nor vital interest then required

this policy of imperialism, according to Mr. Agnew.
Nation made its final efforts to undo all of the arguments of the
imperialists in regard to security, vital interest, and foreign imperialism.
It accused Senator Frye of "suppressing the fa.ct that we have a perpetual
right to the use of Pearl Harbor as a coaling station," when he asked where
the United States would get its c08l. 36

It argued that "without Hawaii,

all our naval force in the Pacific may be employed in attacks upon the

enemy or in defending our own coast.

With it, we must expend some part,

and probably a large part, in defending the islands. ,,37
Nation viewed the security and vital interest of the United States,
the defense of its shores, and its freedom from foreign imperialism, all
part of the future of the United States, without this imperialist or
expansionist policy.

At the same time, expan8ionists relied on the self-

ciefense and vital interest pattern of thought, the fea.r of foreign
imperialism theme, as part of their ideology in support of the "new
imperialism" of 1898.

35Daniel Agnew, "Unconstitutionality of the Hawaiian Treaty," Forum,
XXIV (December, 1897), p. 469.
J6Nation, LXVI (February 3, 1898), p. SO.
37Ibid ., (February 10, 1898), p. 99.

CHAPTER VI
LITERARY MAGAZINES REFLECTION OF

"PARAMOUNT INTEREST"

The thesis that islands and new lands were essential to the defense
of the coasts of the United States appears to have derived its appeal at
least partly from the notion of their necessity to the defense of an interest
of quite a different character.

This paramount interest was for the "national

honor" ot the United States and, implied in this, tor commercial expansion
or economic necessity.

Thus Pacific islands were desired for their provision

of markets and raw materials.

In other words, the islands were the out-

posts not only of coastal defense, but also of the protection of a new
paramount interest, overseas commerce, contributing to the greater national
honor of the United States.
It was not really until the Hawaiian issue of 1893 that expansion ot
commerce began to seem an imperative reason for expansion of territory.
Thus the national honor of the country and economic necessity became a
paramount interest.
Captain Alfred Mahan himself was an influential monitor in his
article of 1893 on the bearing of the annexation of Hawaii upon the
"commercial and military control of the Pacitic. fI

As he stated:

are the main advantages, which can be termed positive:
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These

those, namely,
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which directly advance commercial security and naval control. 01
It was suggested at the very beginning ot the controversy that the
revolution and the movement tor annexation were simply outgrowths ot a
conspiracy ot the sugar interests to get the bounty ot two cents a pound
paid to domestic sugar growers.

Nation called attention to the contract

between the Hawaiian planters and the Western Sugar Retining Company -the Spreokels concern in San Francisco, a branch ot the Sugar Trust -whereby the corporation would receive one-halt ot any bounty that might
be paid to the planters.

"Even it Congress should retain the bounty on

domestic sugar, and ehould annex the islands, it was realized that the
islands might be denied enjoyment ot the bounty in whole or in part."

Thus

was expressed the opinion that the revolution was "ot sugar, by sugar,
and tor sugar.,,2
When the "snap" annexation ot the islands and the assured tailure

ot the precipitate treaty appeared certain, Nation rejoiced and again
criticized Senator Morgan's view that the annexation "would have helped
our trade. 1t3
Rejecting the paramount interest in the Islands as contributing to our
national honor, Nation likewise rejected Mahan's entreaty to tollow England's

1
A. T. Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum, IV (March, 1893),
p. 7.

~t1o,p., LVI

(March 2, 1893), p. 151.

3Ibid., p. 154.
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example by such annexation of foreign territory and foreign population as
it said simply "to promote certain undefined things which he calls national
'influence' and national greatness. 1I4
But John Proctor in the November issue ot Forum, was concerned with
the national honor of the United States in regard to its battle for
commercial supremacy.

He wrote:

We are fast building a Navy large enough to render all necessary
protection to our merchants in foreign ports. Let us hope that the
retorm in our Civil Service will be carried forward. • • and that
all our consular representatives abroad shall be regarded as the
business agents ot our people, and selected with regard to their
business qualifications, and promoted for efficient service. When
all these things have been done and the fetters of our restrictive
laws removed, we shall enter the contest for industrial and commercial supremacy with the conditions greatly in our tavor.;
Nation too, commented on this type of commercial supremacy as BOught
for by Captain Mahan, and linked it with the national honor theme, when
it stated:

"Could the fathers of the republic have foreseen in 1789 what

the views ot a great many ot us as to the conditions o.r national greatness
would be today, how sad it 'WOuld have made them. ,,6 And it laughed at
Lodge's "Americanism," his trite appeal to national honor, in his analysis

ot the foreign policy of the United States. 7

4Nation, LVI (March 9, 1898), p. 174.

5John R. Proctor, "America's Battle tor Commercial Supremacy, It Forum,
XVI (November, 1893), p. 323.
6Nation, LVIII (May 31, 1894), p. 401.
7Ibid., (March 14, 1895), p. 191.
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Lodge had criticized the blundering foreign policy of the United States,
in not strengthening the national honor of the country.

Lodge had

re~

iterated Mahan's theme that "this Administration has done everything in its
power to break down our well-settled policy in regard to t.hose islands
Hawaiia which are so essential to us, both commercially and from a
point of view."

milita~J

Lodge brought up the problem of economic necessity when he

regretted the fact that it had become the fashion to neglect foreign
relations of the United States and this unfortunate tendency had been greatly
stimulated in recent years by the tariff reform or free trade agitation.
He pointed to ideas borrowed fro. England, but he believed that the United
States used them entirely different, in that England never allowed adherence
to theory or foolish love of consistency to interfere with her interests.
He insisted that the free trade ideas of the United States only harmed her,
that the United States did not use them to get privileges in return.

He

concluded that these paramount interests should no longer be neglected. S
To support Lodge' s view, Mahan, in writing on the navy as a career,
pointed to the lack of concern of the people of the United States.

Only

toward foreign affairs, toward the national honor of the United States.
Only those who either reside or have business interests in foreign lands

where political conditions are unsettled, and justice at times hard to
obtain show concern for national paramount interests. 9
S

Henry Cabot Lodge "Our 31undering Foreign Policy," Forum,
(March, 1895), pp. 13-14.

.uK

9Captain A. T. Mahan, "The Navy As a Career," Forum, XX (Nove~ber, 1895),
p. 283.
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But Nation criticized Mahan for his emphasis on constant development
of the nation and of national sentiment, without consideration for any
other thought or force. 10 Nation considered national honor from a different
viewpoint.

In an editorial it struck out:

"We need more men in public life,

in the press, who seek national greatness in the sphere of mind and law,
and resist the popular longing for more bloody corpses, desolated towne,
and the general 'hell of death and destruction' called war. ull
Nation again aired its views on this subject in a specific editorial
entitled "National Honor."

In questioning the appropriateness of a new

and large navy it stated:
• • • the reason which .a Jingo always falls back on, when hard
pressed, for wishing to live in complete armor, is that somebody
may assail our IIhonor" -- that is, say something offend ve, or
refuse to submit to some demand of ours, or resent some of our
language. It is impossible beforehand to describe or define
injuries to honor, because honor is an impalpable thing. • •
In short, when we get our navy and send it around the world in
search of imputations on our honor, we shall have launched the
United States on that old sea of sin and sorrow and ruffianisa
on which mankind has tossed since the dawn of histor,r.12
Reverting again to the economic necessity theme, Forum published
two articles.

The first was written by Edward Atkinson, author of

Collection 2! Revenue and !b!. Distribution g! Profits.

!h!

In it, he spoke

of trade, the purchasing power of countries, imports and exports, and
then concluded:

"It follows that the self-interest as well as the moral

and political welfare of the people of the United States are bound up in
l°Nation, LXI (October 3, 1895), p. 234.
llIbid., (October 31, 1895), pp. 304-305.
12Nation, LXII (January 16, 18<}6), p. 47.
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a close commercial union with the other English-speaking peoples."

\-lith

land, islands, etc. there must be union "for the protection ot commerce and
for the assurance of peace and plenty wherever the dominion of the English
speaking people and its influence extend. nl )
In the second article, Henry Cabot Lodge referred to the duty of the
United States in Cuba, in regard to her economic interests there.

In

speaking of the recurring revolutions and disorders in Cuba, he contended
that "American property on the island is being destroyed and the commerce
with Cuba is being ruined. It

Later in the article, Lodge referred to

Mr. Sumner's words that Cuba must be saved, and wrote:

Mr. Sumner's words state the larger aspect of the question
exactly as it is today. The danger to American property in Cuba,
the ruin of American commerce, the immense field which would be
opened to American enterprise, and the market which would be
secured for American products by Cuban independence • • • are all
weighty reasons for decisive action on our part.14
Lodge here admitted that theee reasons were pecuniary, material, and

interested, and though he also admitted to higher moral reasons, yet he
deemed these others as important and necessary, for our national honor
and for our economic necessity.
In this same way Senator Frye found all of this a necessity and he
would have been ready to seize, fortify, and hold against the world all the
islands on the map, and would have reached out to take whatever was or

l)Edward Atkinson, "The Cost of an Anglo-American War," Forum, XXI
(March, 1896), p. 82.
14Lodge, "Our Duty to Cuba, II Forum, XXI (May, 1896), p. 283.
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might be necessary to the future commercia.l supremacy of the United States
and for these ideas Nation criticized him.1S
Economic betterment for the United States was the result of Forum's
article called "The Wanton Destruction of the American Property in Cuba."
Yznoga was writing about the return of order and prosperity to Cuba as a
result of its annexation by the United States, but feeling this impossible
for the present, he argued that "could Cuba be purchased, the advantages of
this country would be enormous.

A vast field for American enterprise and

capital would be opened up • • • • The cession of Cuba would also remove the
large balance of trade against us. • • for it would open a market for at
least a hundred millions of our products. n16

On this same Cuban problem, Fidel Pierra, the Chairman of the Cuban
Press Delegation, wrote in Forum:

"But i t from a politioal. point of view,

it is to the interest of the United States that Spain should withdraw from
Cuba, from an economic standpoint it is stUl more so."

Pierra then

referred to the fate of the Amerioan property under Spanish rule, the
confiscation of whatever capital remained in Cuba, and the fact that
commerce with the United States would fluctuate, and all of this pointed
to his conclusion that the United States had to adopt a policy that would
bring about the immediate withdrawal of Spain from Cuba. 1 7

Economic

necessity proved an important motive to the expansionists.

l6Femando A. Yznoga, "The Wanton Destruction of the American Property
in Cuba," Forum, XXII (January, 1897). p. 573.
l7Fidel G. Pierra, "The Present and Future of Cuba," Forum, XXII
(February, 1897), p. 670.
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The national honor motive was also again appealed to in reference to
the Anglo-American arbitration treaty.
were presented.

Different views of "national honor lt

As Coudert wrote in the March issue of Forum:

Tradition had ordained that a national honor required to be lubricated with blood in order to be kept in good working condition. • • •
When a sufficient number of men had been slaughtered. and a proper
number of towns had been burned and plundered, • • • Honor smiled
once more with restored cheerfulness. • • • Honor, national honor.
has been a priceless possession. but a very expensive one to keep.
And later the author viewed honor as two great nations who were willing
to abide by reason and to forego violence.

As he said:

• • • let us not be misled by high-sounding declamations about
national honor. The only danger which our honor may run is in
an exaggerated tendency to make readiness to strike, the test
of its delicacy and the proof of its existence. • • • A Republic
with a united nation of seventy millions behind it may stop to
discuss without being taxed with timidity, and will not care if
the effervescent mob that clamors for blood on all available
occasions shall f~el outraged in its honor because of a generous
forbearance to draw the nation's sword. 1S
So Coudert would imply, national honor should not be used as an excuse
or motive by the aggressive imperialists.
of the demands of the

te~

Theirs is a misunderstandir.g

Itnational honor."

Business sentiment seemed still strongly antj.-war and Nation was
quick to point out any new reaction.

In April, 1897, it criticized the

new appointment of a Jingo and annexationist as United States Minister
to Hawaii, who might also try to rush the islands into the Union with the
United States, but then Nation pointed to "new complications. • • • regarding the sugar question, which involve the pending tariff bill, the

18,. R. Coudert, "The Aon:lo-American Arbitration Treaty." Forum, XXIII
(March, 1897), pp. 13, 22.
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beet-sugar people in this country being now opposed to annexation as they
are to reciprocity with Hawaii," and Nation concluded that these "new
influences may thus enter into the decision of the problem now.,,19
Economic concern by business may cause the imperialists to question their
arguments on economic necessity, Nation hoped.
The magazine again referred to Americ.an business interests in an
editorial entitled "Fostering the Beet Sugar Industry."

In its strike

against the United States for its concern only for the "sixty millionaires"
in Hawaii, who are Europeans and Americans and not for the 25,000 Japanese
and others, Nation stated:
Under the new taritf, it is computed that the duties on Hawaiian
sugar, it it should be made to pay duties, would amount to from
$8,000,000 to $12,000,000 a year. In other words, the present
Administration with its eyes open or shut -- probably with them
shut '... is binding the Government to pay bounties, amounting to
at le4st 38,000,000 a year, upon Hawaiian sugar, to these sixty
Hawaiian millionaires. Can the American sugar industry stand up
against such tavoritism as that? Can the Secretary of Agriculture
fight successfully for home-grown sugar against such odds as these?20
The "jingo" in Congress or the press, was an object of intense dislike
to the editors of business and financial journals, who sought to counteract his influence by anti-war editorials in their columns.

Boards of

trade and chambers of commerce added their pleas for the maintenance of
peace to those ot the business newspapers and magazines.
added its voice to both of these groups.

And Nation

On September 16, 1897, it

hapoi1y reported that the annexationists in Hawaii were in a great deal

19Nation, LXIV (April 29, 1897), p. 312.
2ONation, LXV (August 5, 1897), p. 103.

80

of flutter over the arrival of the United States Senators and Representati ves who were to take a near view of their "republic for annexation only."
It further reported that the "ungrateful natives" were preparillg tor the
occasion a "monster petition, II to assert that their country was stolen

tram them by a handful of rich and powerful whites, and that they did not
want to be annexed.

Nation conoluded:

The worst of it is that most of the visiting statesmen are beet sugar
men. Now a beet sugar American is almost certain to be pessimistic
about the institutions ot cane-sugar Hawaii. He will take very high
ground on liberty and constitutional guarantees and the right ot
BUtfrage; and unless the Hawaiians are able to satisty him on all
these points, he will never consent to let the beet sugar grown
by tree men sutter competition trom the cane sugar ot men who are
not enjoying selt-government. This is what makes the annexationists so nervous. Jingoes they oan satisty, big-money men they can
easily persuade that they are ripe tor annexation; but they tremble
under inspection by statesmen thoroughly grounded in the doctrines
of representative government and beet sugar. 2l
Becoming more desperate and determined to prove the talseness ot the
"economic necessity" theme ot the imperialists, Nation invoked again the
understanding of the people tor what was actually happening in regard to
Hawaiian annexation.

Advocates ot Hawaiian annexation had been relieved

to hear that the Sugar Trust had withdrawn its opposition to the treaty.
As it stated:

" . . . somehow Spreckels has been •squared, • the island

planters have been let into the 'deal,' and now all is clear sailing." And
now, Nation cuttingly referred to the tact that the Senate could return to
its high moral plane in discussing annexation.

There had been tor a time,

. Nation reported, a "mercenary tinge ll to the debate, which "must have

2lIbid., (September 16, 1897), p. 2l5.
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pained Senators" -- there was much talk of selfish opposition of beet-sugar
growers and sugar refiners, and hints that there would be something substantial "in it" for certain \vestern Senators if they could beat the treaty.
Now Nation stated:

" ••• it could again dwell upon the lofty morality

ot 3,000 aliens giving away the territory ot 97,000 natives and residents. ,,22
And in its editorial in the same issue, Nation again linked this
"economic necessity" with the unreasonable treatment of the Hawaiian people
when it declared that less than 3,000 ot the "recent Anglo--Saxons" are
pretending to have a right, and are brutally exercising it, to dispose ot
the lives and fortunes ot 25,000 Japanese, 24,000 Chinese, 15,000 Portuguese,
40,000 Hawaiians.

And they are exercising it, Nation maintained, under the

proud device, "Good :Ebsiness Chances Here. ,,23
Then in March, 1898, Nation reterred very strongly tor the last time
to the idea that the war with Spain had become simply a business enterprise.
The sufterings ot the Cubans were wholly lost sight ot in the concem for
economic necessity, the hope of making some money out ot a conflict in
their behalt.

Nation believed that when the present crisis arose, the

business view of war was what was chieny present to the Jingo mind.

Among

the more rampant Jingoes, such as Senator Thurston ot Nebraska, this view
seemed to prevail.

Nation reported that Thurston, just the previoue week,

said to the Senate that war with Spain would increase the business and the
earnings ot every American railroad, it would increase the output of every

22llli., ( October 7, 1897), p. 271.
23
~., p. 272.
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American factory, it would stimulate every branch ot industry and every
domestic commerce, it would greatly increase the demand tor American labor,
and in the end every certificate that represented a share in

~nerican

business enterprise would be 'WOrth more money than it was today.
seemed to be no "national honor" theme in thi3.
was the opposite, a reversal of "national honor."

There

According to Nation, it
As it stated:

In fact, these open avowals of readiness to kill people and destroy
property for purposes of private gain were probably the most
grotesque outcome of Christianity and civilization that the Western
world has ever had. • • • The savage tights under the infiuence of
inherited passions and devilish instincts and an animal view ot
the ends ot life; but even he is not 80 degraded as to fight in
order to make money in trade. 24
fr'0rtU!! also included articles on the paramount interest

necessity theme."

ot "economic

Senator White, though, referred to the argument that the

commerce of the United States with Hawaii was

80

important that the United

states could not aftord to risk outside interference.

Senator White con-

ceded that the United States had valuable trade there, but felt that
"common business sense dictates that a properly framed treaty. • • will
bring all desirable Hawaiian commerce to the United States.

The Hawaiian

Islands will deal with us because their interests make such a course
necessary. ,,25

24Nation, LXVI (March 31, 1898), p. 238.
25Senator Stephen M. White, "The Proposed Annexation of Hawaii," Forum,
XXIII (August, 1897), p. 728.
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But the Honorable John Proctor in Forum argued that our interests as
well

a8

our national honor demanded the annexation of the Hawaiian group.

And our interests appeared to have been the large seaborne commerce on
the Pacific that it would be necessary to protect. 26
Daniel Agnew, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania wrote in Forum and maintained that according to the Constitution
the United States could not annex Hawaii.

He stated that there had always

been a clear necessity for previous annexation, as LoUisiana, Florida,
Alaska, and Texas, and he felt no paramount necessity or interest in the
case of Hawaii.

"Not a 8ingle benefit to be derived from its incorporation

into the Union is an absolute or vital necessity.

All its advantage8 are

simply commercial, and they do not justify a power to purcha8e not found
in the Con8titution."27 Hence the economic necessity of the imperialists
did not satisfy the anti-imperialists.
But in March, 1898, Senator Morgan in Forum, felt that commercial
supremacy for the United State8 was Msicall)" important.

He stated that

the commercial rea80n8 for the annexation of Hawaii were not under-valued
by any merchants, or marines, who have any acquaintance with the trade of
the Pacific Ocean.

And he concluded:

"Annex Hawaii, and we will rapidly

build up at Honolulu, in sight of Pearl Harbor, a commercial mart, like
26

Proctor, "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," Forum, XXIV
(September, 1897), p. 42.
27Daniel Agnew, "Unconstitutionality of the Hawaiian Treaty," Forum,
XXIV (December, 1897), pp. 465-466.

Hong Kong, protected by a fortress, easy of construction, far stronger
than Gibraltar that will stand sentinel over the surrounding ocean.for
thousands of miles. ,,2$
All of this contributed in one way or another, either according to
the views of the imperialists or the anti-imperialists, to the idea and
the reality of the "national honor" of the United States, to her "economic
security" and thus in the long-range plan, to her paramount interest.

2$Senator John T. Morgan, "The Duty of Annexing Hawaii," Forum, YJ.V
(March, 1898), pp. 15-16.

CHAPTER VII

"WORW LEADERSHIP" PAT'l'ERli OF THOUGHT
In the year 1898, America was prepared to reach the height of her
expansionist glory.

Another motive or pattern of thought had arisen

during the nineties to help lead her to this height.

As Weinberg stated:

"It was, in brief, the doctrine that imperialist expansion was a means to
America t S assumption of a role of thorough-going collaboration in pursuing
the interests and duties of world politics."l
This doctrine was, of course, repudiated by the anti-expansionists,
who constantly emphasized the fact that this idea conflicted sharply
with the dominant American policy and attitude of the past, the principle
of independent political action known as isolationism.
Yet, throughout the course of the nineties, the restraining power of
isolationism over American foreign policy visibly lost its strength.
Having noted in 1890 the commercial and strategic needs which were enforcing
upon this countrymen the beginning of an "outward view," Captain Mahan had
written during the discussion of the Hawaiian issue in 1893, that "we
also shall be entangled in the affairs of the great family of nations and
shall have to accept the attendant burdens.,,2

lweinberg, Manifest Destiny, p. 453.
2

Alfred Mahan, Interest of America !!l
85

~

Power, p. 104.
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A foreshadowing of the transition to a larger political outlook also
came in the Venezuelan issue of 1895.

A spark of national pride led to

the feeling that the United States was destined to affect the future of
the world.

And one realized that extent of this feeling when John R.

Proctor stressed in his article in Forum, 1898, "that the retention of the
Philippines was demanded by 'the interests of peace' -- that is, the
necessity of preventing a war of the powers to decide the proper depositor.y
of this vhite man' 8 burden. n3
So America's conception of the territorial expansion essential to the
international activities of a world power also had its foundation in the
1890's, and Forum and Nation either supported this growing concept of world
leadership as part of the "national prestige" and "political power" due
to the new role of the United States, or reacted against it adversely as
being contrary to any necessity for the well-being of the United States or
of the world.
Formerly, Hawaii's membership in America's economic system made it
seem the one proper exception to the continental policy.

In the expansion

movement of 1893, Hawaii seemed to Mahan, in an article in Forum, only the
first fruit of a policy entangling us in the commercial even if not the
political rivalries of the outside world. 4

3John R. Proctor, nlsolation or Imperialism," Forum, XXVI (1898), p. 25.
4A• T. Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," Forum, XV (March,
1893), p. 9,
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Nation did not feel that the United States had to be entangled in
such political and commercial rivalries as that, but, as it stated in an
article on Hawaii:

nAs other nations have respected our wishes in the

mat ter in the past, they would respect them in the future all the more
as our power to command respect increases with revolving years. 115

It

further disagreed with Mahan's thesis to secure world leadership or more
specifically national prestige and power by "following England t s example
by such annexations of foreign territory and foreign populations as seem

likely to promote such undefined things which he calls national 'influence'
and national greatness, by securing naval predominance on the Pacific, or
'the control of the Pacific," as he calls it. n6
of reasoning to its logical conclusion -

Nation followed this type

that this type of "national

prestige" 'WOuld require a. navy equal to the largest now existing, in order
to secure and protect such outlying dependencies, and Nation did not vision
this as

worl~

leadership, but a "war of giants."

In its review of Rev. Josiah Strongls book, The

!!!l!~,

Nation

ridiculed his ideas that the civilization or all peoples is inversely as
their isolation and that it is one e.f the signs of being on the verge of
the millennium, or new era, that steam and electricity render isolation
and therefore barbarism, impossible.

So to save civilization, Strong would

5Nation~ LVI (February 2, 1893), p. 75.
6

~., (March

9, 1893), p. 174.

imply, the United States must take its position as a world leader, but
Nation disagreed with these generalizations. 7
In reviewing the foreign policy of the United States from 1893 to
1895, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his article in Forum, regretted the Administration's policy of retreat and surrender.

Lodge firmly believed that the

United States must show its concern for national prestige and political
power in a practical way, by its leadership in controlling Hawaii, Samoa,
and Cuba.

He believed that the United States had not become the leader

of the world she should have become, because of the neglect of foreign
relations.

As he said:

IIFor more than thirty years we have been so much

absorbed with grave domestic questions that we have lost sight of these
vast interests which are just outside our borders.

They ought to be

neglected no longer. n8
~ation

did not agree with Lodge or Mahan in their ideas of how the

United States should acquire national prestige and political power.
regretfully commented:

It

"Could the fathers of the republic have foreseen

in 1789 what the views of a great many of us as to the conditions of
national greatness would be today, how sad it would have made them. ,,9
But Nation did agree with and applaud Mr. Gresham in his report on
the Samoan matters to the President.

Nation quoted Mr. Gresham's report:

7Nation, LVII (July 20, 1893), p. 52.
8
Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign policy, It Forum, XIX (March, 1895),
pp. 15-17.
9

~Y.2!!I LVIII (May )1, 1894) I' p. 401.

It is in our relations to Samoa that we have made the first
departure from our traditional and well-established policy of
avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers in relations
remote from this hemisphere • • • • Every nation, and especially
every strong nation, must sometimes be conscious of an impulse
to rush into difficulties that do not concern it, except in a
highly imaginary way. To restrain the indulgence of such a
propensity is not only the part of wisdom, but a duty we owe to
the world as an example of the strength, the moderation, and the
beneficence of popular government. lO
Nation agreed with Mr. Gresham's conclusion that the experiences of the
United States have shown it to be a wise policy to avoid such entangling
alliances that have not only failed to correct, but have aggravated the
very evils which they were designed to prevent.

World Leadership then,

did not require that the United States be involved in such issues with
foreign nations.
Just as Nation approved of Mr. Gresham's views, so it condemned
Senator Frye's ideas.

Nation commented on Frye's illogical tenacity to

"seize, fortify, and hold against the world all the islands on the map."
His desire for the United States to lead as a world power was not accepted
by Nation. ll
Both Nation and Forum presented views on the Monroe Doctrine and its
application in these world affairs.
Nation began its series of articles on this problem, in an editorial
entitled, "Some Monroe Myths."

It pointed out the fact that Seward's

lOIbid., (June 28, 1894), p. 481.

~ation, LX (April 11, 1895), p. 269.
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ordering of the French out of Mexico was entirely different from sending
the British out of Nicaragua.

That was not a matter of showing the national

prestige of the United States by enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, because the
Monroe Doctrine was not involved in this cas8. l2 And later that year, in
an editorial speaking of the Venezuelan difficulty, Nation commented:
Whether Great Britain or Venezuela has the better historical
and legal title to the territory 80 long in dispute between those
two countries, no one without the easy omniscience of a Lodge, a
Campbell, a Blaine, or a Tribune editor would venture to decide
offhand • • • • When Venezuela finds out that Salisbury and Chamberlain mean what they say, and that our Government means what it
says - that there is no possibility of a bloody-Monroe doctrine
war, in which we should get all the hard knocks and the Venezuelans
all the glory -- negotiations with England will probably be reopened and the prolonged dispute amicably settled. 1 3
In an editorial the following week, Nation re-iterated its conviction that
the United States had no duty or right by the Monroe Doctrine to protect
the South American states "against the natural consequences of their own
insolence and folly" -- that the United States did not have to become
involved in every entanglement and war to show its leadership to the world. 14
It again rejected this involvement in another editorial in which it
concluded:
It is a remarkable example of the power ot words to take the
place of ideas that our Government should now revert to the Monroe
Doctrine and call upon us to stand by Venezuela, as a republic,
against Great Britrdn -- our ally in the previous controversy --

l2Ibid., (May 9, 1895), p. 356.
llriation, LXI (October 24, 1895), p. 286.
14Ibid., (October 31, 1895), p. 305.
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as a monarchy • • • • In a word, the American Secretary of State's
Olney references to Venezuelan republicanism and friendship and
English monarchy and hostility have no more to do with the facts
than with the planet Jupiter. 15
The following month,

r~ation

showed her regret that the United States

had to show her political power and her right as a leader in the world,
by "insolence, abusiveness, and brutality," and that, in short, in international affairs, "the ruffianly way is the more excellent way."

Nothing,

Nation felt, was more of a discredit to our civilization and actually to
our national preetige.16
Oscar Straus, in his article in Forum, upheld the Monroe Doctrine as
a preserver of peace, and maintained that every assertion of it Ithas had
the effect of averting the calamities of war."

Later he stated that:

"Mr. Cleveland has responded to this grave duty in order to avert a hostile

collision between the two great English speaking peoples, who should ever
remain strenuous and worthy rivals in all the acts of peace."17
Forum also presented the views of J. W. Miller, Commander of the
First Naval Battalion.

Mr. Miller, in writing about the rumors of war,

stated:
Therefore, facing the situation fairly and squarely, convinced
that the people demand the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, we
must at once put ourselves in a position to enforce with measurable

l5Nation, LXII (January 2, 1896), p. 5.
16 Ibid. , ( February 20, 1896) I p. 152.
l70ecar S. Straus, "Lord Salisbury and the Monroe Doctrine," Forum,

xx: (February, 1896), p. 720.
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dignity, a recognition of the American continental policy. The
situation, the times, are ripe for quick action: the question is,
What shall we do?lS
And Mr. Miller then concluded that the national prestige of the United States
demanded that Congress begin the system of coast defenses and the construction of more battle-ships.

The United States must take its position as a

world leader.
The Chairman of the Cuban Press Delegation also wrote in

Fo~~

of the

"perpetual source ot annoyance, of irritation, and of danger to the United
States" of Spanish domination in Cuba.

"Of danger," he stated, Itin so tar

as it may, at any time, give rise to international complications of a
nature which it is not possible to foresee. • • • Cuba will be a running sore
in the side of the United States." And the only way for the United States
to show her "political power" concluded Mr. Pierra, was "by complete
cauterization," which meant the

I~tter

separation of Spain from the

country.,,19 The United States must then retain her national prestige to be
a world leader.
And it the other powers ot the world are looking to the Pacific area,
then the United States must do the same, according to Mr. Proctor, in
his article in Forum.

As he said:

The presence of Russia in the Far East, and the possibility of a
combination between Russia and China, tollowed by the awakening of
China from her sleep of centuries, the extension of French dominion

ISJ. W. Miller, "Rumors ot War and Resultant Duties, ft Forum, XXI

(April, 1096), p. 240.

.

19Fidel G. Pierra, tiThe Presant &.00 Future of Cuba," Forum, XXII
(February, 1897), pp. 669-670.
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in Indo-China, Siam, and Madagascar, the partitioning of Africa and
the islands of the Pacific among European Powers; the industrial
growth of Japan ••• all tend to change the front of the world, and .
to transfer to the placid Pacific the national activities which,
for three centuries past, have rendered the Atlantic the theatre
of stirring event. 20
So the United States must accept her role as a leader in the world of
nations, and as a leader must retain her power through expansion in the
Pacific area.

It would follow then, that she must also protect this

national prestige of hers, b,y being prepared and ready to fight for her
political power.

And it is this preparedness against the nations of the

world that Murat Halstead pleaded for in his article in Forum, "American
Annexation and Armament.,,21
Nation quite clearly stated its over-all stand on this issue of
national prestige and political power in its editorial, "Jingo Morality./I
Nation explained:
But there is a Jingoism which comes to us in quite another guise.
It is clad in the soft raiment of an attractive literary style
and wears an appearance of high philosophy. In fine Hegelian
phrases it talks about a nation coming to self-consciousness,
suddenly awaking to the fact that it has international duties
as well as intemational rights and preparing to go forth with
lofty benevolence, like a knight of the Round Table, to redress
wrongs and establish justice the world over. 22

20proctor, "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," Forum, XXIV
(September, 1897), p. 38.
21Halstead, "American Annexation and Armament," Forum, XXIV (September,
1897), pp. 56-66.

2~ation, LXI (October 3, 1895), pp. 234-235.
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Nation accused Captain Mahan of being the leading exponent of this
refined Jingoism, and believed that Mahan would logically accede to the
fact that this "American domination over any inferior power would have
nothing more to do with morality than an earthquake."

But, Nation strongly

maintained that this "earthquake and physical power doctrine is a most
dangerous one for any time or people."

In other words, it believed

that this political power theme that would lead to world leadership, was
simply a means used as justification for an ignorant and brutal proposal
of foreign aggression and conquest.

And this was not considered real

power, nor would it lead to true world leaderehip.2.3
Yet the argument that the United States must accept and if necessary
fight to maintain her role as a world leader, was also strongly endorsed
by the imperialists of 1898.

This was all linked to the duty of the

United States, to her natural right, to her national honor, to her
vital necessity -- all of this implied in her world leadership role or
pattern.

_.

2.3Ibid

CHAPTER VIII
CONCWSION
It has been the purpose of this study to analyze expansionist feeling
in the United States for the years 1893-1898, as it was reflected especially
in two of the nation's periodical press, and to treat the evidences of this
teeling in such a way as to shed light on the origins of American imperialism.
Many years betore the United States, at the close ot the last century,
embarked on a career of overseas expansion and took its place as one of the
world t s great powers, signs and portents ot a rising interest in external
atfairs made their appearance in the periodical literature.

No claim is

made that the expansionist sentiment in the periodicals was in itself
responsible for the imperialist outburst ot 1898.

But it is tirmly

believed that the evidence presented demonstrates that the periodicals
were an important agency tor creating an atmosphere tavorable to expansion.
An important part of this atmosphere was the ideology ot expansion.
The basic concepts that composed the tramework ot this ideology -inevitable destiny, mission or "white man's burden," ideas of selt-defense,
paramount interest, and world leadership -- made their appearance in the
writings of such men as Fiske, Strong, Burgess, and Mahan.

Placing emphasis

upon these central ideas, these men furnished the American people with a
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philosophical justification for expansion.

However, the work of providing

the nation with an expan"ionist ideology was by no means limited to a
individuals.

tGW

These fundamental concepts were also being offered to the

nation through an important segment of the popular press -- the periodical
literature.
In the periodicals studied, as in the writings of the theorists,
racism appears to have been a dominant abstraction used to justify
expansion.

Here were emphasized the expansion qualities of the Anglo-

Saxon, his mission to give to others the benefits ot his superior institutions, and the need for racial unity as a means of extending his
power and influence throughout the world.

An examination of Forum indicates that racism was BIOst commonly
revealed in the allusions the periodical made to the need for understanding,
cooperation, and even unity among the English speaking peoples.

In these

allusions there is implied or expressed the belief that such a relationship
would involve the increasing participation of the United States in matters
lying bayom her own borders.

They are, then, not only expressions ot

racism but are also expressions of racial expansionism.
There were, ot course, critics of racism, and Nation was one such
critic.

It was particularly adverse to furgess' brand of Teutonic racism,

and it deplored the tendency on the part of many Americans to assume that
it was the destiny of the Saxon not. merely to predominate in North America,
but to monopoli se it.

97

Present also in the periodicals were allusions to other basic
expansionist concepts.

As it had many times before in American histor,y,

the idea of destiny made its appearance.
necessary to support the idea of destiny.

Editors and writers felt it
others, with more regard for

semantics, argued simply that it was senseless to resist an expansion that
was inevitable or predetermined, and some placed sxpansion still farther
beyond the will of the American people and claimed that it was the destiny
of others that was driving them into the arms of the United States.

These

On the

ideas were seen frequently in the writings and articles of Forum.

other hand, as seen in its articles, Nation deplored the search for glory
and aggrandizement abroad and refused to accept the idea that this destiny
was inevitable.

It was critical in its writings of Mahan for speaking of

the development of the nation and of national sentiment as a natural force.
The record of Forum indicates also the prevalence of a sense of
mission during this period, of a belief that expansion was necessary in
order that the nation might do its duty in the spreading of civilization
and democracy.

The assertion of such claims brought from the anti-

expansionist Nation a particularly sharp rebuttal, and it severely
criticized the hiding of this imperialistic tendency toward expansion
behind the cloak or moral respectability.
The literature studied al80 includes evidence or a growing feeling
that expansion was dictated by certain vital national interests.

Strategic

interests were among the basic national interests driving the nation
toward expansion~
revival.

The United States was in the midst of a period of naval

Much of the discussion in Forum relative to this revival stressed
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the need for naval strength to secure the nation's defenses.
also the period of Mahan.

But this was

Mahan's writings focused attention not upon

narrow defensive needs but upon offensive action, upon the strategic
importance of the Caribbean, the isthmian canal, and Hawaii.

Even more

important, by establishing the inter-relationship of industry, markets,
bases, merchant marine, and

nav,y~

he set forth a theory of sea power that

was essentially a theory of mercantUe expansion.

WhUe Forum, on the

whole, supported these ideas of Mahan, ideas of self-defense and tnus
naval necessity for security, Nation found reason to criticize both the
general ideas of security and vital interest and the specific ideas of
Mahan.
Among the most important of the national or paramount interests
impelling this country toward expansion was the economic interest.
Although the pitfall of attributing the whole movement toward expansion
to economic motives should be avoided, the evidence of the material in
Forum and Nation makes it impossible to shove economic considerations
into the background.

Although there are only scattered evidences of a

desire to expand politically in order to assure the nation'. economic
prosperity, there was a large body of sentiment favoring extemal economic
expansion.
No evidence can really be found to prove or disprove the contention
that

,.~ernal

surpluses.

economic expansion was required to relieve industrial

But whether this need was real or imagined, Forum refiected

a feeling that foreign markets were becoming essential to the nation·s
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economic welfare.

Its articles showed the widespread feeling that the

country must or should extend its economic activity beyond its bor.ders and
develop and acquire markets abroad for its products.

Nation, on the other

hand, rejected these ideas.
It may, of course, be argued that during the early period there is
little evidence that such expansion had become a vital necessity and that
those who in editorials and articles advocated such a course were engaged
in agitating a myth.

There is no proof that during these years the country

was faced with the problem of disposing of a surplus of industrial products
and capital or that the extension of its economic activity abroad was in
fact important to its welfare and. security.

However, the period which

closely followed was a period of tremendous external economic expansion,
a period which saw the erection of a political and financial empire and
the emergence of the United States as the world's dominant power.

The

advocates of economic expansion during the years 1893-1898 may have been
anticipating the future; they helped prepare the way for the period that
followed.
The United States was also impelled toward expansion by the interaction of ideas and interests with events.

The public discussion re-

flected in Forum stimulated the feeling that the United States should
assume a larger role in world affairs,

~llle

Nation held that expansionism

was not necessary for national prestige and political power.

The public

debate over the Hawaiian issue, 1893-1895, contained all the elements
needed for a debate on the whole problem of foreign acquisitions.

Re-

vealed in the periodical literature, especially Forum, is a body of opinion
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which favored annexation for a wide variety of reasons -- strategic,
economic, and human! tarian.

But what is more important, this literature

indicates that many believed Hawaiian annexation to be not a "sporadic
effort," as Mahan phrased it, but rather as the first fruit of a comprehensive program of external expansion.
Nation reflected evidences of anti-expansionist feeling.

The ver,y

existence of an opposition viewpoint is noteworthy, for it indicates
that during these years expansionist sentiment was prevalent enough and
strong enough to evoke a rebuttal.
The af'lsumption may be made that since the origins of the new
imperialism are to be detected in the periodical literature, so too, may
the beginnings of the anti-imperialist movement of 1898-1900, embark
permanently upon a career of imperialist aggrandizement.

That the nation

stopped short of such a career after 1900 was due in part to the influence
of the anti-imperialists, and it is likely also that hostile critics of
expansion during the period 1895-1898 shared in determining the course
this nation was later to take.

These early critics could not prevent the

expansion of the United States, but by holding expansionist sentiment
among their contemporaries up to the light of critical inquir,y, they
helped insure that the nation in its twentieth century expansion would
follow a path consistent with its better traditions, rather than the
path

,~..,f

imperialism.

The expansionist sentiment that appeared in the periodicals during
the years 1893-1898 provides no definitive explanation for the expansion
of the United States during the years that followed.

The outburst of 1898,

101
the arrival of the United States as a world power at the turn of the
century, and the continu6d expansion of the nation's power and influence
since that time are developments far too complex to be explained solely
from the early signs of expansionist feeling in the periodicals.

But

these signa are important; that the United States was later to
travel the road of external expansion was determined partly by the
urgings of those who, during these germinal yearD, used the periodical
press as a vehicle for their expansionist views.
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